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Abstract 
 
The global financial and economic crisis marks an important turning point for finance and 
the Asian growth model. Regional consensus is now supporting economic rebalancing 
away from the dominant focus on exports to developed markets and towards more a 
more balanced economic structure supported by domestic and regional financial 
development. In relation to finance, the crisis highlights the necessity of addressing a 
range of issues across the region. First, Asian approaches to financial liberalization, 
prudential regulation, and financial innovation are likely to be closely considered around 
the world. At the same time, while the region has not been at the center of the global 
crisis—in contrast to the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98—it nonetheless provides an 
important opportunity to strengthen domestic and regional financial regulation. Second, 
beyond the post-crisis issues, and the prevention of systemic risk in particular, finance 
must continue to play a central role in supporting economic development and poverty 
reduction across the region. While the global crisis has highlighted once again the risks 
of finance, a central objective across Asia must be financial sector development to 
support economic growth and development. Third, in addition to domestic reform, the 
crisis provides an opportunity to enhance the international financial architecture, not only 
to improve its efficacy, but also to enhance the role of empowered Asian economies in 
global fora and institutions. At the same time, weaknesses in the international financial 
architecture suggest the need for Asian regional alternatives to address liquidity, 
liberalization, regulation, and exchange rate volatility. 
 
 
Keywords: Global financial crisis, Group of 20, systemic risk, financial sector 
development 
JEL Classification : G01, G15, G17, G18, G24, G28, G32, G33, G34, G35, G38 
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1. Introduction 
 
From the 1950s to the 1980s, individual economies in Asia adopted a range of models to 
support economic growth and development. These ranged from Soviet-derived models 
of state ownership and control to liberal laissez-faire, with approaches to finance varying 
from model to model. Of the various models adopted by the end of the 1980s, the 
Japanese model of the developmental state with administrative direction of finance had 
proven the most successful in supporting balanced and inclusive economic growth and 
development. In variations of this model adopted sequentially across most East Asian 
jurisdictions, economic growth derived from an export-led strategy, based on close 
relationships between government, business, and finance—with finance largely 
emanating from banks and to a lesser extent equity finance from minority shareholder 
structures. 1  During this period, economic regionalism, generally, and financial 
regionalism, especially, were very limited, with Asian economies focusing primarily on 
their relations with developed Western markets and financial systems.  
 
During the 1990s, Asian economies focused on increasing integration with the global 
economy and financial system, adopting Washington Consensus policies supporting 
economic and financial liberalization. In addition, economic interactions within the region, 
especially trade and investment, began to increase. At the same time, the role of finance 
in the Asian growth model set the stage for the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98.  
 
The Asian financial crisis marked an important turning point in the role of finance in most 
Asian economies, given the failure of the model of finance developed in the context of 
the Japanese-inspired model of the developmental state and at the same time a 
rejection of rapid financial liberalization. The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning 
of significant economic and financial regionalism in East Asia,2 as economies looked to 
common interests not appropriately addressed through the existing international financial 
architecture, specifically, rejecting involvement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). During the following decade, Asian economies continued to focus on export-led 
growth, but now combined it with gradual financial liberalization, regional cooperation on 
issues of common concern, and accumulation of defensive foreign exchange reserves. 
 
The global financial and economic crisis which commenced in 2007 marks another 
important turning point in Asia’s development. In the wake of the crisis—with its main 
impact in the region to date resulting from the collapse in trade to developed markets in 
2008/09—regional consensus has shifted to support economic rebalancing away from 
strategies dominated by exports to Europe and the United States (US), and towards 
more balanced domestic economies and economic relationships regionally and 
internationally. In addition, consensus now exists to enhance domestic and regional 
financial development to maximize the developmental benefits of savings resources 
generated in the region.  
 
In Asia, the global financial crisis highlights the necessity of addressing a range of issues 
relating to finance. First, regarding financial stability, the crisis holds important lessons 
and presents significant opportunities for enhancing financial regulation in the region. At 
                                                 
1 For discussion, see Liu, Arner, and Lejot (Forthcoming). 
2 See Arner, Lejot, and Wang (2009). 
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the same time, the global crisis highlights the potential for greater Asian leadership in 
regulatory issues, based on the relative success of more conservative Asian approaches 
compared to those of the US and the United Kingdom (UK). In this context, Asian 
approaches to liberalization, prudential regulation, and financial innovation are likely to 
be closely considered around the world. Second, in relation to financial sector 
development, Asian financial systems, despite having developed significantly since the 
Asian financial crisis, retain considerable scope for development—a necessity in the 
context of effectively allocating regional financial surpluses to support domestic and 
regional development and economic rebalancing. While developmental needs are 
pronounced in some economies, all economies in the region would benefit from greater 
focus on improving underlying financial infrastructure. Third, in addition to domestic and 
regional considerations, the crisis provides an opportunity to enhance the international 
financial architecture, not only to improve its efficacy, but also to enhance the role of 
empowered Asian economies in global fora and institutions, such as the IMF, Group of 
20 (G20), and Financial Stability Board (FSB). At the same time, weaknesses in the 
international financial architecture suggest the need for continued development of Asian 
regional alternatives to address issues including liquidity, liberalization, regulation, and 
exchange rate volatility. At the same time, recent experiences in the European Union 
(EU), especially the euro area, highlight the importance of carefully considering potential 
weaknesses and risks in regional financial arrangements. 
 
Sections 1 and 2 provide an overview of the global financial crisis and G20 and regional 
responses. From this basis, sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 address the "four pillars" of the G20 
financial reform process and their implications for Asia: (i) financial regulation and 
infrastructure (section 3), (ii) financial supervision (section 4), (iii) systemically important 
financial institutions and financial institution resolution (section 5), (iv) and 
implementation of international standards (section 4). Section 7 turns to an issue of 
particular importance to the region: financial sector development to support growth and 
address imbalances. Section 8 discusses reforms to the international financial 
architecture and argues for the development of effective and complementary regional 
financial architecture. Section 9 looks forward to challenges and policy options for the 
region. 
 
 
2. The Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Implications for 
Finance in Asia  
 
In essence, the global financial crisis resulted from an unprecedented period of 
excessive borrowing, lending, and investment incentivized by a series of significant 
economic and regulatory factors.3 Excesses in borrowing and lending most directly arose 
in the context of the market for subprime residential mortgages in the US, especially 
during 2005 and 2006. However, over-borrowing and over-lending were prevalent in 
virtually all asset classes globally, including commercial real estate, corporate lending 
(especially for mergers and acquisitions, and private equity transactions), commodities, 
and international equities (especially emerging markets). These excesses were not 
limited to the US; they were truly global, impacting almost every market and asset class. 
                                                 
3 For detailed discussion, see Group of 30 (2009); de Larosière et al (2009); Financial Services Authority 
(UK) (2009); Arner (2009). 
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This broad-based borrowing and lending surge was fuelled by over-investment from a 
wide range of investors around the world. 
 
Borrowing, lending, and investment were inextricably interconnected through a range of 
transaction structures derived from well understood techniques of securitization—the 
transmission mechanism between borrowing, lending, and investment.4 In its basic form, 
securitization is a transaction structure in which loans, such as loans secured by 
residential real estate (i.e. mortgages), are pooled together, or repackaged, as collateral 
underlying the issuance of (predominantly debt) securities. At its simplest, securitization 
makes a great deal of sense since it allows the distribution of risks to a wider pool of 
investors, thereby reducing the cost of borrowing for ultimate borrowers and reducing the 
risk to lenders of defaults on underlying loans. At the same time, however, the structure 
has the potential to provide significant incentives for abuse, including excessive 
complexity and financialization, which is essentially a disassociation between financial 
and real economic activity). These distorted incentives in many ways lie at the heart of 
the global financial crisis. In the US, in particular, loans came to be made not by banks 
with an on-going interest in their repayment, but instead by non-regulated specialists—
mortgage brokers for real estate and a range of financial institutions, especially 
investment banks, for corporate loans—intent on profiting from charging to arrange 
loans. In the extreme form of the originate-and-distribute model of finance, which 
became common at the beginning of the 21st century, there was no intention of 
maintaining an interest in the ability of the borrower to repay in the future.  
 
Securitization was thus the central linkage between investment in credit securities and 
borrowing and lending. Such investment was largely the result of two economic factors: 
(i) the period of low interest rates in Japan in the wake of the onset of its banking crisis 
at the beginning of the 1990s and in the US following the bursting of the dotcom bubble 
in 2001, and (ii) the imbalances in saving and investment between the Anglo-American 
economies, especially the US and UK, and the rest of the world, especially Japan, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the major oil-producing economies such as 
Russia and Saudi Arabia, largely resulting from accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves in the wake of experiences during the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. The 
combination of low interest rates and large volumes of investment funds from outside the 
US and the UK supported massive investment in debt securities in New York and 
London designed to produce an appealing combination of perceived safety and 
attractive yields. 
 
In addition to issues which arose in the context of relatively simple securitization 
transactions, the technology of securitization was expanded over the decade preceding 
the global financial crisis to encompass a range of ever-more complex techniques and 
structures, including structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits to purchase 
mass-produced structured investment products, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), synthetic securitizations, and a range of other 
exotics such as CDOs and synthetic CDOs. Many of these took the technology of 
securitization—the pooling of portfolios of risks, off-balance sheet structures, capital 
markets funding—and combined it with that of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, 
especially credit derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS). While the complexities 
inherent in such transaction structures in hindsight may seem an obvious source of risk, 
                                                 
4 For detailed discussion, see Lejot, Arner, and Schou-Zibell (2008). 
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in fact, in the period leading up to the global financial crisis such techniques received 
important support and developmental incentives from regulators around the world. This 
combination of complexity, financialization, misaligned regulatory incentives and failures, 
corporate governance and risk management deficiencies, abundant liquidity, and 
massive global investor demand set the stage for the crisis. 
 
Following interest rate increases in major markets and peaks in the US residential real 
estate market and resultant gradual shifts in market sentiment, the complex transmission 
mechanisms at the heart of the financial excesses preceding the onset of the global 
financial crisis ceased to function. As a result of the lack of transparency resulting from 
complexity and risk distribution, a cycle of adverse selection, loss of confidence, 
changes in market psychology and investor preferences amongst wholesale market 
participants combined to produce a closure of the primary interbank funding 
mechanisms in the global financial markets, eventually leading to the failure of significant 
international financial institutions around the world. Complexity and lack of transparency 
in relation to financial markets, institutions and products, moral hazard, and improperly 
designed financial infrastructure and regulatory systems hindered appropriate 
responses. Following coordinated international action in 2008/09 to address systemic 
financial issues, in 2010, questions arose with respect to both future growth prospects in 
the US and EU as well as structural weaknesses in euro area monetary and fiscal 
systems, resulting in a new phase of the crisis, currently expressed in continuing 
concerns regarding growth prospects and fiscal and financial sustainability in developed 
economies. 
 
2.1 International Responses 
 
At the international level, the G20 has assumed the leading role in coordinating 
responses and reforms. In addressing the causes and necessary responses to the 
global financial crisis, in November 2008, the leaders of the G20 established five main 
principles to guide reforms: (i) strengthening transparency and accountability, (ii) 
enhancing sound regulation, (iii) promoting integrity in financial markets, (iv) reinforcing 
international cooperation, and (v) reforming the financial architecture. For each of these 
five principles, the G20 established a detailed action plan, incorporating both immediate- 
and medium-term actions. The detailed action plan established the core content of the 
refinements to international financial regulatory standards, which are now taking place 
through fora such as the FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
G20 leaders tasked their respective finance ministers to give highest priority to six areas: 
(i) mitigating against pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy; (ii) reviewing and aligning global 
accounting standards, particularly for complex securities, (iii) strengthening the resilience 
and transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, 
including by improving the infrastructure of the OTC markets; (iv) reviewing 
compensation practices as they relate to incentives for risk-taking and innovation; (v) 
reviewing the international financial architecture, and (vi) defining the scope of 
systemically important financial institutions and determining their appropriate regulation 
and oversight.  
 
In April 2009, G20 leaders pledged to do whatever is necessary to (i) restore confidence 
and growth; (ii) repair the financial system; (iii) strengthen financial regulation; (iv) fund 
and reform international financial institutions; (v) reject protectionism and promote global 
trade and investment; and (vi) build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery. In 
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relation to financial regulation and supervision, the leaders committed to build a stronger, 
more-globally-consistent supervisory and regulatory framework for the future financial 
sector to support sustainable growth and serve the needs of business and citizens. In 
September 2009, the G20 reiterated their support for existing initiatives and committed 
to continuing implementation of agreed actions. 
 
In June 2010, G20 leaders refocused attention on financial sector reform under a four 
pillar structure and further developed principles relating to balanced growth, with the next 
leaders meeting in the Republic of Korea (Korea) in November 2010 being set to review 
progress not only in relation to regulatory issues, but also with respect to reform of the 
international financial architecture. The four pillars include (i) a strong regulatory 
framework, (ii) effective supervision, (iii) resolution of and addressing systemically 
important financial institutions, and (iv) transparent international assessment and peer 
review.5 
 
For Asia, the key lessons of the crisis include the need to enhance mechanisms to 
address economic and financial stability, rebalance economies towards greater domestic 
consumption, promote regional trade and investment, and establish more effective 
domestic and regional financial systems. In looking to financial regulation, the G20 
response provide the initial framework of analysis not only for Asian G20 members but 
more broadly as well. As the foundation, G20 leaders agreed that regulation and 
supervision must be designed to achieve a series of specific objectives: (i) promote 
propriety, integrity, and transparency; (ii) guard against risk across the financial system; 
(iii) dampen rather than amplify financial and economic cycles; (iv) reduce reliance on 
inappropriately risky sources of financing; and (v) discourage excessive risk-taking.  
 
In addressing financial regulation objectives, the leaders initially focussed on five major 
areas. First, in relation to international cooperation and financial standards, the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) was renamed and reconstituted as the FSB which includes all G20 
countries, former FSF members, Spain, and the European Commission.6 In relation to 
surveillance, the FSB and IMF were directed to develop appropriate early 
macroeconomic and financial warning systems. In addition, the G20 committed to take 
action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens.7 Second, in relation to 
the scope of regulation, leaders committed to reshaping regulatory systems to address 
macroprudential risks; extend regulation to all systemically important financial 
institutions, instruments, and markets, including systemically important hedge funds; and 
reform regulation and supervision of credit rating agencies. Third, in relation to corporate 
governance, the leaders endorsed new principles on pay and compensation, 8  and 
committed to supporting sustainable compensation schemes and the corporate social 
responsibility of all firms. The result is the basis of a globally agreed approach to 
                                                 
5 G20 (2010). 
6 See Arner and Taylor (2009). Eight Asian economies are now also represented on the FSB: Reserve 
Bank of Australia and the Treasury (Australia); People’s Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, Ministry of Finance (PRC); Hong Kong Monetary Authority (Hong Kong, China); Reserve 
Bank of India, Securities and Exchange Board of India, Ministry of Finance (India); Bank Indonesia 
(Indonesia); Bank of Japan, Financial Services Agency, Ministry of Finance (Japan); Bank of Korea, 
Financial Services Commission (Korea); and Monetary Authority of Singapore (Singapore). 
7 See OECD (2009). 
8 FSF (2009d). 
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financial sector compensation and its regulation—potentially one of the most far-
reaching consequences of the crisis. Fourth, in relation to prudential regulation, in the 
context of eventual recovery, which is now taking hold in Asia, G20 leaders agreed to 
improve the quality, quantity, and international consistency of capital, including 
regulation to prevent excessive leverage and requirements for buffers of resources to be 
built-up in good times. Fifth, in relation to transparency, the G20 called on accounting 
standard setters to improve standards on valuation and provisioning, and achieve a 
single set of high-quality global accounting standards. In relation to financial regulatory 
commitments, an annex to the leaders’ statement provides greater detail in eight major 
areas: (i) FSB, (ii) international cooperation (focusing on financial institution failures), (iii) 
prudential regulation, (iv) scope of regulation, (v) compensation, (vi) tax havens and non-
cooperative jurisdictions, (vii) accounting standards, and (viii) credit rating agencies. 
 
Despite the range of coverage, it remains open to debate whether the G20 response to 
date, if implemented prior to the global financial crisis, would have in fact been sufficient 
to prevent its occurrence—arguably the central policy objective at this point in time. 
 
2.2 Regional Responses 
 
Given that it was not at the epicenter of the crisis, the region’s response to the global 
financial crisis has been more limited than in the US and Europe. First, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) received support for a capital increase from its shareholders, 
intended to finance additional resources to weakened economies in developing member 
economies (DMCs).9 Second, ADB has extended additional financing and developed a 
range of new facilities.10 Third, in February 2009 ASEAN+311 committed itself to the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), although work is ongoing in relation to 
administrative and implementation arrangements. As an interim arrangement, this 
function is being undertaken by ADB in coordination with the ASEAN Secretariat.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 ADB, General Capital Increase V, online: <http://www.adb.org/GCI/default.asp>. 
10 First, ADB’s crisis-related lending increased by more than US$10 billion in 2009-2010, bringing total 
ADB assistance for these two years to about US$32 billion. (The increase in lending comprises US$1 
billion for trade finance, US$3 billion for the Countercyclical Support Facility and about US$6 billion to 
extend loans such as those for infrastructure investment.) Second, ADB support is being extended to 
both public and private sectors, with higher levels of concessional and non-concessional lending 
volume and guarantees for 2009-2010. Third, ADB is expanding support for infrastructure 
development. To this end, ADB is expanding the Asian Infrastructure initiative and is working 
proactively to arrange additional cofinancing for developing member country infrastructure 
development. Fourth, ADB is taking steps to rebuild business confidence, provide incentives for private 
sector investment, and facilitate trade financing. These private sector initiatives aim to deliver short-
term finance and capital to vulnerable banking systems, either directly through ADB private sector 
operations or indirectly via government programs supporting bank recapitalization. Fifth, ADB is 
developing a bank liquidity guarantee program  to provide partial credit guarantee cover for short-term 
borrowings by systemically important banking institutions. Finally, ADB provides policy analysis and 
knowledge support. To optimize impact, ADB is working closely with its development partners in the 
region, as well as with the IMF, the World Bank and regional organizations such as ASEAN, SAARC 
and APEC. 
11 ASEAN+3 comprises the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus the People’s 
Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
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2.3 Lessons of the Crisis 
 
The global financial crisis has underlined the fact that preventing and addressing 
systemic risk (i.e., supporting financial stability) is the fundamental aspect of financial 
regulatory design. Systemic risk is defined as 
 
the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and 
attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial 
system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects 
on the economy. Systemic risk events can be sudden and unexpected, or the 
likelihood of their occurrence can build up through time in the absence of 
appropriate policy responses. The adverse real economic effects from systemic 
problems are generally seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, 
to credit flows, and from the destruction of asset values.12 
 
In the global financial crisis, it was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 
15 September 2008 which finally triggered a global systemic financial crisis, causing "a 
loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a 
substantial portion of the financial system serious enough to have significant adverse 
effects on the economy."13 In the first half of 2010, there was a clear risk of another 
major financial crisis, this time emanating from the euro area of the EU. Clearly, existing 
international arrangements prior to the crisis, and specifically in the US and the EU, were 
insufficient to preserve financial stability. 
 
Designing a regulatory system to address systemic risks requires the following elements 
to be addressed: (i) a robust financial infrastructure (especially payment and settlement 
systems); (ii) well-managed financial institutions with effective corporate governance and 
risk management systems; (iii) disclosure requirements sufficient to support market 
discipline; (iv) regulatory systems designed to reinforce management and market 
discipline, as well as limiting and monitoring potential risks across all financial 
institutions; (v) a liquidity provider of last resort to provide liquidity to financial institutions 
and markets on an appropriate basis; (vi) mechanisms for resolving problem institutions; 
and (vii) mechanisms to protect financial services consumers in the event of financial 
institution failure.14 
  
In each of these areas, there were clear weaknesses which combined to contribute to 
the global financial crisis. In hindsight, it is now clear that (i) too much attention was 
placed on monetary policy rather than balancing monetary policy and financial stability, 
(ii) regulatory attention focussed excessively on the safety and soundness of individual 
financial institutions rather than on systemic risks and linkages across institutions and 
markets, (iii) prudential regulatory and risk management systems did not take adequate 
account of market cycles and crises, and (iv) the realities of potential failures of large 
complex financial institutions had not been adequately addressed in advance. While the 
major regulatory failures at the heart of the crisis did not have their epicenter in Asia, 
there are nonetheless clear lessons for enhancing financial regulation in the region. 
                                                 
12 G10 (2001), p. 126-127. 
13 Ibid., p. 127. 
14 See Arner (2007). For an alternate view of systemic risk, see Schwarcz (2008). 
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Asia’s developing, emerging, and developed economies must all take steps to address 
the lessons from the global financial crisis. In this context, developing economies should 
focus on issues relating to financial sector development (discussed in greater detail in 
section 7), and in particular on building effective and stable financial sectors. For Asia’s 
emerging and developed economies (especially G20 members), attention should focus 
on financial stability arrangements, albeit not to the excessive detriment of financial 
sector development. In these respects, attention should focus on the four pillars 
identified by the G20: (i) a strong regulatory framework and robust financial market 
infrastructure (section 3); (ii) effective macroprudential and microprudential supervision 
(section 4); (iii) financial institution resolution and addressing systemic institutions 
(section 5); and (iv) transparent international and regional assessment, and peer review 
(section 6). In addition, the crisis provides an important opportunity to strengthen both 
the international and regional financial architecture (section 8). 
 
 
3. Pillar I: Enhancing Financial Regulation and Financial 
Infrastructure 
 
In relation to the first pillar—financial regulation and financial infrastructure—the G20 is 
addressing a range of specific issues, including: (i) capital, leverage, liquidity, and 
procyclicality; (ii) OTC derivatives markets; (iii) accounting standards; (iv) compensation 
arrangements; and (v) expanding the regulatory perimeter to address hedge funds, 
credit ratings and credit rating agencies, and securitization.15 While the focus of concern 
in much of Asia differs from that of Europe and the US, each of these areas requires 
attention in the region. 
 
3.1 Capital, Leverage, Liquidity, and Procyclicality 
 
Weaknesses in capital, leverage, and liquidity of individual financial institutions were 
central to both the 2007–10 global financial crisis and the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. 
In addition, existing capital standards played a role in both incentivizing excesses in 
lending during periods of high growth while restricting lending during recessionary 
periods. In other words, capital standards operated in a procyclical manner. 
 
In this respect, the G20 has placed major attention on capital, liquidity, and leverage 
regulation as well as in reducing their potential procyclical effects. In this context, 
however, G20 members face conflicting objectives. Specifically, stronger capital 
requirements are necessary to prevent future crises, but at the same time, higher capital 
requirements restrict lending, thereby limiting the financial sector’s capacity to support 
growth in the context of economic weakness. This is further complicated by the different 
economic situations across the G20, with the US, Europe, and Japan experiencing weak 
growth, while emerging markets, especially in Asia, are more concerned with possible 
overheating and asset price inflation.  
 
In 2008 and 2009, the G20 committed to introducing enhanced systems for capital, 
liquidity, and leverage regulation, with the BCBS and FSB given the task of development. 
In addition, the G20 also committed to the implementation of the Basel II capital 
                                                 
15 See G20 (2010); FSB (2010d, 2010b). 
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adequacy framework, agreed upon in 2004, although in a revised form reflecting 
experiences and lessons of the global financial crisis. This revised framework is being 
increasingly referred to as Basel III. 
 
Beyond capital, the FSB, BCBS, Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), 
and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) are tasked to implement 
recommendations to address procyclicality. Further, in addition to capital and aspects of 
procyclicality, for the first time the G20 committed to a simple, transparent, non-risk 
based measure which is internationally comparable, properly takes into account off-
balance sheet exposures, and can help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking 
system. The new measure is essentially a leverage ratio to restrict overall leverage 
across the financial system. The BCBS was also tasked to develop a framework to 
improve incentives for risk management of securitization, including due diligence and 
quantitative retention requirements. Finally, in addition to capital and leverage standards, 
the G20 committed to a new liquidity standard, with the BCBS tasked to develop a global 
framework for promoting stronger liquidity buffers at financial institutions, including 
cross-border institutions. 
 
Although Asia’s financial institutions have been relatively less effected than US and 
European financial institutions in terms of capital, liquidity, and leverage, they will clearly 
need to work to address international standards as they are developed. Moreover, given 
that ASEAN+3 is emerging from the crisis before the US and Europe, approaches within 
the region’s leading economies are likely to be increasingly influential internationally, 
especially in the context of anti-cyclical prudential approaches such as property lending 
limits. As financial institution capital requirements now focus increasingly on equity, it will 
be important for Asian jurisdictions to consider whether domestic and regional equity 
markets are able to provide sufficient sources of funding to support equity capital 
requirements. 
 
Internationally, the BCBS has moved quickly to address related issues. First, in April 
2009 it made a series of recommendations for addressing procyclicality.16 Second, in 
July 2009 the Committee announced measures to strengthen the market risk 
framework 17  and enhance Basel II. 18  Initial changes included introducing higher-risk 
weightings for securitization (pillar 1), issues relating to supervisory review of risk 
management (pillar 2), and disclosure requirements (pillar 3). Third, the Committee 
released for consultation, as part of its comprehensive approach announced in 
September 2009, a proposal to address (i) improving the quality and harmonization of 
capital, focusing on the role of Tier 1 equity; (ii) strengthening counterparty capital 
requirements relating to derivatives, repos, and securities financing, with an intention to 
incentivize movement to central counterparties and exchanges; (iii) introducing a 
leverage ratio; (iv) measures to promote a countercyclical capital framework, including 
provisioning; and (v) introducing a minimum liquidity standard.19 Fourth, the Committee 
                                                 
16 FSF (2009f). 
17 BCBS (2009f, 2009e). 
18 BCBS (2009d). 
19 BCBS (2009b, 2009c). 
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is currently working on proposals relating to macroprudential supervision (discussed in 
section 4 below).20 
 
In June 2010, the G20 reiterated its support for development of "a new global regime for 
bank capital and liquidity." 21  Under the agreement, "the amount of capital will be 
significantly higher" and "the quality of capital will be significantly improved" to "enable 
banks to withstand—without extraordinary government support—stresses of a 
magnitude associated with the recent financial crisis." Specifically, the G20 agreed that 
the new capital framework would:22 
 
(i) establish a new requirement that each bank hold in Tier 1 capital, at a 
minimum, an increasing share of common equity, after deductions, 
measured as a percentage of risk-weighted assets sufficient to withstand 
with going concern fully-loss absorbing capital stresses equivalent to 
those of the global financial crisis; and 
 
(ii) move to a globally consistent and transparent set of conservative 
deductions generally applied at the level of common equity or its 
equivalent in the case of non-joint stock companies over a suitable 
globally consistent transition period. 
 
In September 2010, the BCBS agreed the underlying elements of the new Basel III 
capital adequacy regime. 23  In relation to capital, rather than the Basel I–Basel II 
framework of 8% capital to risk-weighted assets, with at least half in Tier 1 equity and 
hybrid instruments supplemented by Tier 2 subordinated debt and a range of innovative 
instruments supporting market risk (Tier 3), The Committee adopted a structure focused 
on common equity capital. Under the agreement, total minimum capital remains at 8%. 
However, minimum common equity capital is 4.5%, with Tier 1 capital at 6%, leaving Tier 
2 at most 2%. In addition, there will be a 2.5% conservation buffer, made up of common 
equity, for a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10.5%. Finally, there will be the 
possibility for an additional countercyclical buffer of 0-2.5% of common equity or "other 
fully loss absorbing capital", the details of which are yet to be finalized.  
 
Thus, it is now abundantly clear that financial institutions, as now required by markets, 
will in many cases need to have higher amounts of equity capital. In addition, the global 
crisis highlighted that subordinated debt, at least when held by other financial 
institutions, is unlikely to provide much in the way of external monitoring, thereby 
ameliorating its role in supporting corporate governance and financial stability. As a 
result, subordinated debt is has become significantly less important in terms of capital.  
 
In addressing these issues, Asian economies have in many cases already begun to take 
action, despite the fact that the BCBS has agreed that final implementation will not be 
required until 2019. In looking to the region’s needs, most important will be supporting 
supervisory capacity in related areas. In addition, given the increased importance of 
                                                 
20 FSB (2009b), p. 4. 
21 G20 (2010), p. 4. 
22 Ibid., p. 16. 
23 BCBS (2010d). 
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equity capital, regional equity market development can both assist and be assisted, with 
debt capital markets remaining a continuing area of necessary focus. 
 
At the same time, the crisis has brought forward proposals relating to innovative capital 
instruments, such as contingent convertible securities ("cocos"), which automatically 
convert to equity when financial institutions’ capital ratios drop to certain preset levels, as 
well as other hybrids pre-committing investors to provide additional capital as equity or 
debt at certain trigger points. As the types of qualifying instruments become clear, Asian 
jurisdictions will have to carefully evaluate the capabilities of their existing domestic and 
regional markets to support such capital provision. Finally, it appears likely that many of 
the previous techniques prevalent in the use of structured products and derivatives to 
arbitrage regulatory capital, especially in the US and Europe, will no longer be available. 
In this context, Asian regulators will need to have a clear understanding of the various 
forms of capital available in order to judge whether instruments proposed are in fact 
appropriate and in need of regulatory approval.  
 
The other side of the equation is also being considered, relating to the various 
methodologies for calculating risk-weightings for assets. While Basel I was overly 
simplistic, Basel II was overly complex and too reliant on both external credit ratings and 
internal quantitative models. As a result, both were highly subject to gaming by market 
participants, with regulators in the US and UK adopting excessively permissive 
approaches to such behavior and instruments. In relation to assets, as a result of the 
crisis, issues relating to off-balance sheet treatment are being reconsidered and 
tightened to avoid a return of the shadow banking system and also to reduce complexity 
of institutions and products. One area receiving particularly close scrutiny is market risk, 
with the view that market risk should be much more closely regulated than has 
previously been the case. Such issues are tied closely not only with regulatory 
standards, but also with accounting treatment. 
 
Beyond capital, Basel III appears likely to add both a leverage ratio as well as liquidity 
requirements. As of September 2010, the final details of both the leverage and liquidity 
requirements were still under discussion, although the BCBS has now agreed that 
minimum liquidity requirements for both coverage and funding will be introduced in 2015 
and 2018 respectively.24 In the region, most jurisdictions already use a range of liquidity 
requirements (typically associated with domestic government bond markets) and these 
approaches may require fine-tuning as a result of international developments. For less 
developed economies, there will be a clear need for continued focus, not only on 
enhancing regulation, but also on developing domestic and regional government bond 
markets to support appropriate liquidity management.  
 
In relation to leverage, this is an important development in that a central failure of 
Basel II was its over-complexity and the resultant proclivity of financial institutions to 
seek to game the system. A simple leverage ratio has the important potential to not only 
limit a central aspect of the build-up of the crisis (through leverage and related asset 
price inflation), but also to limit the potential for gaming the capital framework. 
 
Beyond bank capital, the work of the BCBS, and the emergence of Basel III, other 
financial standards setters (especially for securities and insurance) are now developing 
                                                 
24 BCBS (2010d). 
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parallel capital frameworks to enhance financial stability and reduce regulatory arbitrage. 
Given that in most jurisdictions (including in Asia), regulation of non-bank financial 
institutions such as securities firms and insurance companies tends to be weaker than 
that of banks, there is a clear need for review mechanisms and related assistance, both 
domestically and regionally. 
 
In looking forward, regional fora such as the Executives' Meeting of East Asia and 
Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) and the emerging Asian Financial Stability Dialogue 
(AFSD) provide opportunities not only for Asia to influence standards being developed 
through the BCBS and others, but also to regionalize international standards as they 
develop, enhance financial stability in the region, and take into account the needs for 
developmental guidance in regulation across much of the region. 
 
3.2 OTC Derivatives Markets 
 
Prior to the global financial crisis, regulation of OTC derivatives markets was generally 
left to private ordering, most often led by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), with markets limited to only sophisticated participants and 
supervision being undertaken through monitoring of the major bank participants in the 
market. At the same time, OTC derivatives received significant legal and regulatory 
support through amendments to Basel I and their incorporation into Basel II, as well as 
legal changes to support netting in many jurisdictions. In the wake of the global financial 
crisis, the lack of transparency in these instruments and markets has been a particular 
area of concern, especially given their central role in the context of the near collapse of 
AIG in 2008 and the 2010 Greek debt crisis. 
 
As a result, the G20 has identified strengthening the resilience and transparency of 
credit derivatives markets, and reducing their systemic risks, including by improving the 
infrastructure of the OTC markets, as an area of priority concern. In this context, G20 
leaders have focused on five elements: (i) launching CDS central counterparty systems, 
(ii) reducing systemic risks in CDS and OTC derivatives transactions, (iii) developing 
exchange-traded or electronic trading platforms for CDS, (iv) expanding OTC derivatives 
market transparency, and (v) improving the robustness of OTC derivatives infrastructure. 
 
In relation to OTC markets, in September 2009 an OTC Derivatives Regulators’ Forum 
was established. However, at inception, it only included representatives from Australia25 
and Japan26 from the Asia–Pacific region. In addition, the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS) are currently reviewing existing standards for central counterparties 
and developing standards for OTC derivatives trade repositories, with draft guidance 
released in May 2010.27 
 
In June 2010, the G20 pledged to accelerate the implementation of OTC derivatives 
regulation, reaffirming commitments to trade all standardized OTC derivatives on 
                                                 
25 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, and 
Reserve Bank of Australia. 
26 Bank of Japan, Japan Financial Services Agency. 
27 CPSS–IOSCO (2010a, 2010b). 
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exchanges or electronic clearing platforms and clear through central counterparty 
clearinghouses (CCPs) by end-2012 at the latest, with reporting to trade repositories. 
 
In looking forward, there are five main approaches being proposed: (i) prohibition, (ii) 
transparency, (iii) clearing–settlement, (iv) exchange migration, and (5) private ordering. 
Prior to the Greek debt crisis, prohibition did not appear to have significant support. 
However, there now appears to be increasing support for proposals relating to the 
prohibition of naked sovereign CDS, in order to reduce speculation. Historically, 
however, prohibitions of financial products have generally not been successful. In 
addition, in the context of global financial markets, any such approach without universal 
agreement is likely to provide significant opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. As a 
result, it seems unlikely that this approach will be widely adopted. At the same time, 
while ISDA and other market participants continue to lobby strongly for OTC derivatives 
markets remaining largely unregulated in privately ordered markets, the status quo 
seems unlikely to remain, despite ISDA’s efforts to enhance its role and restructure its 
organization to parallel the changes made to the IASB post-Enron. As a result, efforts to 
enhance transparency, improve clearing and settlement arrangements, and support 
migration of products to exchange-traded environments appear to be the most likely 
result going forward. 
 
To date, the US and Europe have taken a leading role in addressing issues relating to 
regulation, clearing, and settlement. Despite their faults, derivatives markets play an 
important role in risk management and market efficiency. Given the benefits of such 
markets and instruments, this is an area where Asia needs to take further steps, at both 
the domestic and regional levels. While OTC derivatives markets are currently less 
developed in Asia than in Europe or North America, this provides an opportunity for the 
region—whether at the domestic or regional levels—to migrate markets to structures 
based on transparent trading and clearing arrangements informed by emerging global 
best practices. 
 
3.3 Accounting Standards 
 
The lack of transparency of institutions, products, and markets was central to the 
process of adverse selection and loss of confidence as the "Great Moderation" of the 
beginning of the decade transformed into a global financial crisis. Likewise, issues 
relating to transparency made regulation of firms, markets, and products difficult, and 
complicated responses as the crisis developed. 
 
In relation to accounting, the G20 has repeatedly stated its commitment to the 
development of a single set of international accounting standards. At the same time, it 
appears increasingly likely that for the foreseeable future, there will remain two main 
systems of accounting: IASB International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). At present, major issues have arisen 
in the context of what is the appropriate focus of accounting: the fair value approach 
based on market values or the historical basis approach focused on longer horizons. 
While accounting standard-setters are moving closer on these issues, they are likely to 
remain contentious for some time. In addition, there are a range of issues relating to the 
relationship between accounting and regulatory treatment, for instance in relation to 
capital, off-balance sheet treatment, and provisioning. In this context, one objective of 
Basel II was to bring economic, accounting, and regulatory capital together. At present, 
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standards and approaches to economic, accounting, and regulatory capital may once 
again be diverging, even though convergence of the three forms of capital remains a 
goal. 
 
In June 2010, the G20 reiterated its support for convergence and development of a 
single set of high quality global accounting standards, as well as for the IASB to expand 
its outreach to emerging economies.28 
 
Most economies in Asia have or are in the process of bringing their domestic systems of 
accounting into line with IFRS. As highlighted in Table 1, it has become policy in some of 
the region’s economies to follow international accounting standards established by the 
IASB and to adjust individual economies’ accounting rules to be in line with IFRS. At 
present, no Asian jurisdiction has replaced national accounting standards with IFRS. The 
picture is somewhat weaker in relation to international standards on auditing (ISA), but 
still quite positive.  
 
Table 1: IFRS Adoption in Developed and Emerging East Asia 
 
 
IFRS not permitted 
for domestic listed 
companies 
IFRS required for all domestic 
listed companies 
Australia  X 
China, People’s Rep. of 
Hong Kong, China X X 
India  2011 
Indonesia X  
Japan X  
Korea, Rep. of  2011 (permitted in 2009) 
Malaysia  X 
Philippines  X 
Singapore  X 
Taipei,China X  
Thailand X  
 
IFRS = International Financial Reporting Standards. 
Source: www.iasb.org, www.iosco.org, and authors’ research. 
 
In this context, there is clearly a need for continued building of accounting infrastructure 
across the region in line with international standards, especially in the context of human 
capital development in the accounting and auditing professions. This is also an area 
where regional convergence should be attainable. Asian jurisdictions are already 
converging domestic standards to international standards. As has been done in the EU, 
ASEAN+3 and other regional fora can make an explicit commitment for this to continue. 
Such a commitment would enhance transparency across the region as well as support 
domestic and regional financial development. 
                                                 
28 G20 (2010), p. 20. 
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3.4 Compensation Arrangements 
 
Improperly assigned incentives played an important role in the build-up of excesses 
leading up to the global financial crisis. In this context, particular attention should be 
focused on compensation practices in the financial sector which led to a short-term bias 
as well as excessive risk taking in the industry. 
 
The G20 April 2009 communiqué contained a strong commitment on compensation, 
which has been supported by the release of related principles from the FSB. According 
to the G20 and the FSB, the principles require: (i) firms’ boards of directors to play an 
active role in the design, operation, and evaluation of compensation schemes; (ii) 
compensation arrangements, including bonuses, to properly reflect risk and the timing 
and composition of payments to be sensitive to the time horizon of risks, with payments 
not finalized over short periods where risks are realized over long periods; and (iii) firms 
to publicly disclose clear, comprehensive, and timely information about compensation to 
stakeholders, including shareholders. Significantly, the G20 committed to having national 
supervisors implement the principles in order to be effective for 2009 compensation 
arrangements, with the BCBS integrating the principles into guidance, and supervisors 
assessing firm compensation and intervening as necessary. 
 
Internationally, the FSB released principles for compensation in April 2009 29  and 
implementation standards in September 2009.30 In March 2010, the FSB released its 
peer review of compensation.31 In Asia, G20 members have implemented the principles 
or released proposals to do so. Nonetheless, this will be a potentially more difficult issue 
in some Asian financial centers, which have been relatively less affected by the crisis but 
which stand to gain from allowing more competitive compensation structures. At the 
same time, within Asia, there are likely to be conflicts between financial centers, such as 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China, and jurisdictions focusing more on balanced 
development, such as the PRC and Japan. 
 
3.5 Expanding the Regulatory Perimeter: Regulation of Non-traditional 
Financial Firms 
 
In the context of both the 2007–10 global financial crisis and the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis, issues relating to expansion of the regulatory perimeter32 have received significant 
attention, including hedge funds and credit ratings and credit rating agencies. In addition, 
in the wake of the global financial crisis, a third issue is now being discussed: 
securitization. An additional area of significant relevance in Asia relates to sovereign 
wealth funds.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 FSF (2009d). 
30 FSB (2009a). 
31 FSB (2010c). 
32 See FSB (2010b) 
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3.5.1 Hedge Funds 
 
While hedge funds were often viewed as major causes of the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis, during the recent global financial crisis, they have not received a central portion of 
the blame. At the same time, due to the lack of transparency in the industry, they have 
remained a continuing issue for attention, especially in continental Europe.  
 
At the international level, the G20 has agreed that hedge funds should be subject to 
appropriate regulation, especially in the context of systemically important hedge funds 
given the experience with Long-term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, but also 
focusing generally on enhancing the transparency of the industry. To date, IOSCO has 
established six high level principles for regulation,33 guidance addressing funds of hedge 
funds,34 and a template for the global collection of hedge fund information to support 
transparency and supervision.35 Significantly, IOSCO released a revised version of its 
key principles document, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, including a 
new principle requiring hedge funds and hedge fund managers/advisors to be subject to 
appropriate oversight.36 
 
In the context of Asia, conflicts may arise between continuing post-Asian financial crisis 
anti-speculative regulatory tendencies and potential competitive advantages in attracting 
an increasing percentage of the hedge fund industry to Asia’s growing economy and 
financial system. Given this potential conflict, Asian financial centers should pay careful 
attention to international norms in balancing their needs for stability and transparency 
against competitiveness and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. 
 
3.5.2 Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
Prior to the global financial crisis, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), especially from major 
emerging and developing economies in Asia and the Middle East, began receiving 
significant attention from developed Western economies concerned with their rising 
financial power and close state connections.37 During the early stages of the global 
financial crisis, US and European financial institutions and officials looked to SWFs as 
possible solutions, in the form of necessary capital investments to shore up weakening 
banks and investment banks. In the wake of the global financial crisis, international 
approaches to SWFs appear to be taking on a more balanced and nuanced nature, with 
recognition of their potential value as well as their potential limitations, including 
concerns relating to sovereignty and international economic competition and influence. 
 
As the result of an IMF initiative, the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (IWG) was established in 2008. In October 2008, the IWG released the Santiago 
Principles for SWFs.38 In April 2009, IWG members agreed to establish the International 
                                                 
33 IOSCO (2009e). 
34 IOSCO (2009d). 
35 See FSB (2010b), p. 13. 
36 IOSCO (2010). 
37 Asia Bond Monitor April 2008. Asian Development Bank. 
38 IWG (2008). 
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Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, which includes five Asia–Pacific members. 39  In 
relation to SWFs and given the significance of such funds in the region, development of 
regional approaches could potentially be very valuable. This is especially important in 
relation to supporting the redirection of SWF investments into the region’s economies 
and financial systems. At the same time, however, SWFs raise real concerns regarding 
the use of state resources, which remain complex within the region. 
 
3.5.3 Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Prior to the global financial crisis, credit rating agencies (CRAs) had been periodically 
subject to criticism—in the context of most corporate and financial crises—and as a 
result some attention had been given to their role and regulation, such as IOSCO’s 2003 
Principles for the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies40 and Code of Conduct.41 However, 
since the global financial crisis credit ratings and CRAs have become a central focus. 
 
As an initial step in 2008, IOSCO revised the Code of Conduct in response to the initial 
stages of the crisis,42 including adding certain provisions regarding structured finance. 
The FSF also met and released a report on Enhancing Market and Institutional 
Resilience which, in many ways, would come to be overshadowed by subsequent 
events. In this report, the FSF focused on regulatory reforms in five main areas, 
including the role and uses of credit ratings, and a mandate to review the use of credit 
ratings and regulation of CRAs through IOSCO, the Joint Forum and domestic 
regulators.43 This report focused on two main aspects: (i) regulation of CRAs, and (ii) 
reducing regulatory and market reliance on credit ratings themselves. In a follow-up 
report during the systemic phase of the crisis, the FSF reviewed progress and 
recommitted to the content of its April 2008 report, including CRAs and credit ratings, 
especially in regard to establishing a globally consistent approach to CRA regulation.44 
Both of these FSF reports were subsequently largely subsumed in the November 2008, 
April 2009, and September 2009 G20 statements, all of which express commitment to 
the regulation of CRAs. 
 
More recently, IOSCO has conducted a review of the implementation of the Code of 
Conduct 45  and released guidance relating to international cooperation in CRA 
oversight.46 Most significantly, and related to the 2008 FSF report, the Joint Forum has 
reviewed the use of credit ratings.47 Most significantly, in June 2010, the G20 committed 
                                                 
39 Australia (The Future Fund), Korea (Korea Investment Corporation), New Zealand (New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund), PRC (China Investment Corporation), and Singapore (Temasek Holdings, 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation). 
40 IOSCO (2003).  
41 IOSCO (2004). 
42 IOSCO (2008). 
43 FSF (2008a).  
44 FSF (2008b). 
45 IOSCO (2009g). 
46 IOSCO (2009a). 
47 Joint Forum (2009b). 
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"to reduce reliance on external ratings in rules and regulations," 48  which was an 
important step in enhancing market functioning going forward. 
 
Asia has been working to develop domestic and regional institutions. The Association of 
Credit Ratings in Asia (ACRAA)49 was organized in 2001 at ADB by 15 Asian CRAs from 
13 economies. ACRAA currently includes 25 rating agencies from 14 economies in 
Asia.50  
 
ACRAA has created a Best Practices Committee and Training Committee, established a 
Code of Ethics and a Best Practices Checklist, and hosted a range of workshops. 
Significantly, however, the lower level of ratings use for regulatory purposes, which is 
partially the result of less developed markets for ratings in the region, has meant that 
ratings and CRAs are less of a concern in the region than elsewhere. The global 
financial crisis highlighted the dangers inherent in relying on CRAs to the detriment of 
investor and regulatory due diligence. In this context, the region has a real opportunity to 
avoid excessively imbedding credit ratings in regulation—especially capital, liquidity, and 
asset management regulation—all of which contributed to the excessive reliance placed 
upon credit ratings and CRAs in global markets prior to the global financial crisis. Asian 
jurisdictions should carefully consider the roles played by credit ratings and CRAs in the 
region’s financial systems, with a bias towards encouraging investor responsibility and 
away from excessive reliance on credit ratings in debt capital markets and regulation. 
 
3.5.4 Securitization 
 
Clearly, techniques of securitization were abused prior to the global financial crisis. 
Instruments, markets, and methodologies—especially their over-complexity, 
financialization, and lack of transparency—were at the heart of the crisis. At the same 
time, securitization provides a range of potential benefits in relation to financing and risk-
sharing. The result is that securitization should not be prohibited, but that significant 
changes to regulatory treatment are necessary to support effectively functioning 
markets. 
 
To date, securitization markets have not yet recovered internationally. While a range of 
reports and standards have been released,51 significant questions regarding the future of 
securitization remain. At the same time, prior to the global financial crisis, securitization 
markets in Asia were less developed than those in Europe or North America. The result 
has been that finance and financial institutions in Asia are less dependent on 
securitization than their developed world counterparts. In looking forward, regional 
                                                 
48 G20 (2010), p. 19. 
49 ACRAA’s objectives are to (i) develop and maintain cooperative efforts that promote interaction and 
the exchange of ideas, experiences, information, knowledge, and skills among CRAs in Asia, and 
enhance their capabilities and role in providing reliable market information; (ii) undertake activities 
aimed at promoting the adoption of best practices and common standards that ensure high quality and 
comparability of credit ratings throughout the region, following the highest norms of ethics and 
professional conduct; and (iii) undertake activities aimed at promoting the development of Asia's bond 
markets and cross-border investment throughout the region. 
50 Bahrain, Bangladesh; China, People’s Republic of; India; Indonesia; Japan; Korea, Republic of; 
Malaysia; Pakistan; Philippines; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Thailand; and Uzbekistan. 
51 Joint Forum (2009a); IOSCO (2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e, 2009f). 
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approaches focusing on transparency and disclosure, centralized trading and investor 
due diligence have the potential to support market development, financial stability, and 
economic growth. 
 
 
4. Pillar II: Supporting Effective Macroprudential                  
and Microprudential Supervision  
 
At the heart of the global financial crisis were two serious supervisory failures, both 
relating to the scope and coverage of regulation, domestically, regionally, and 
internationally. As a result, the G20 in June 2010 identified supervision as the second 
pillar of their financial reform agenda.52 
 
First, in a number of jurisdictions, especially the US, regulatory gaps, overlaps, and 
divisions presented opportunities for regulatory avoidance and arbitrage. Combined with 
a general philosophy of regulatory permissiveness, this allowed financial institutions to 
organize their operations to minimize and in many cases avoid regulatory scrutiny. At the 
same time, global markets and financial institutions maximized regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities within individual economies and across jurisdictions, with the result being 
that no single regulator had a clear picture of all of the activities and risks of any given 
global financial institution or market despite the attention placed on consolidated 
supervision during the 2 decades prior to the global financial crisis. Moreover, in reality, 
financial institution management in most cases did not have a clear understanding of the 
scope of their own operations, risks, and legal structure. These elements have been 
brought to light most clearly in the context of the near failure of AIG and the insolvency 
of Lehman Brothers. Likewise, significant financial markets were organized to minimize 
regulatory scrutiny and interference, resulting in a lack of transparency for complex 
global financial institutions and for many of the markets and products in which they dealt. 
The clearest examples were the markets for credit risk transfer such as securitization 
and CDS, with the most extreme example being the pre-crisis shadow banking system of 
conduits, SIVs, and complex structured products. 
 
Second, financial authorities—finance ministries, central banks, and regulatory 
agencies—focused excessively on the safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions, or microprudential supervision. As noted in the previous paragraph, in many 
cases authorities failed even in this responsibility while in addition failing to consider 
linkages across institutions, markets, and products, or macroprudential supervision. 
Macroprudential supervision was largely neglected, despite increasing numbers of 
central banks being given or taking on specific objectives relating to overall financial 
stability in the 10 years preceding the global crisis. 
 
4.1 International Responses 
 
Following the November 2008 G20 Declaration that all systemically important financial 
institutions, markets, and instruments would be subject to appropriate regulation, in April 
2009, the G20 Financial System Declaration provided a much greater level of detail. 
Specifically, the April Declaration included eight aspects. First, regulatory systems 
                                                 
52 G20 (2010), p. 4. 
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should be reformed to ensure authorities are able to identify and take account of 
macroprudential risks across the financial system including in the case of regulated 
banks, shadow banks, and private pools of capital to limit the build-up of systemic risk, 
with the FSB, BIS, and international standard-setters tasked to develop specific 
macroprudential tools. Second, the G20 agreed that large and complex financial 
institutions require particularly careful oversight given their systemic importance. While 
seemingly self-evident, this reflects an important shift in emphasis from the pre-crisis 
period, in which such firms were viewed as better able to address the risks they faced 
than regulators, to the post-crisis period, in which the internal risk management systems 
of large financial institutions will be particularly closely monitored by regulators. In 
support of this, G20 national regulators must have the powers necessary to gather 
relevant information on all material financial institutions, markets, and instruments in 
order to assess the potential for either their failure or severe stress to contribute to 
systemic risk. In addition, in order to prevent regulatory arbitrage, the IMF and the FSB 
are developing guidelines for national authorities to assess whether a financial institution, 
market, or instrument is systemically important.  
 
Beyond traditionally systemically significant firms, hedge funds or their managers are to 
be registered and required to disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis to 
supervisors or regulators—including leverage—necessary for assessment of the 
systemic risks that they pose individually or collectively. At the same time, supervisors 
will require institutions which have hedge funds as their counterparties to have effective 
risk management, including mechanisms to monitor the funds’ leverage and set limits for 
single counterparty exposures. In relation to credit derivatives, standardization and 
resilience of credit derivatives markets, in particular through the establishment of central 
counterparties and clearing arrangements subject to effective regulation and supervision, 
will be promoted through working in conjunction with industry participants in developing 
an action plan on standardization, with ISDA having taken a particularly active role thus 
far. Finally, in relation to keeping pace with future innovation, G20 members will each 
review and adapt the boundaries of their regulatory frameworks regularly to keep pace 
with developments in the financial system and promote good practices and consistent 
approaches at the international level. 
 
In addressing prevention, the global financial crisis has shown that the overall design 
and coverage of a regulatory system are vital to its effectiveness. In Asia and 
internationally, as highlighted by the G20, there is an urgent need to review and enhance 
the scope of regulation, focusing on regulatory design to eliminate gaps and implement 
effective macroprudential financial system oversight. This requires a reshaping of 
regulatory systems so that authorities are able to identify and take account of 
macroprudential risks, with the scope of regulation and oversight extending to 
systemically important financial institutions, instruments and markets, including non-bank 
financial institutions, and to CRAs to ensure they meet the international code of good 
practice, particularly to prevent unacceptable conflicts of interest. In addition, prudential 
standards must be designed to address cross-sectional dimensions—how risk is 
distributed across a financial system—and time dimensions—how aggregate risk 
evolves over time—to build buffers for use in bad times. 
 
In June 2010, the G20 tasked the FSB in consultation with the IMF to report on 
recommendations to strengthen both macroprudential and microprudential oversight and 
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supervision, specifically relating to the mandate, capacity, and resourcing of supervisors 
and specific powers to proactively identify and address risks.53  
 
For Asia, two central lessons can be drawn. The first is the necessity of putting in place 
appropriate macroprudential arrangements, domestically and regionally. The second is 
the necessity of reviewing the design of domestic and regional regulatory structures to 
address gaps and reduce the potential for regulatory arbitrage. 
 
4.2 Macroprudential Supervision 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, there has been widespread recognition of the 
need to (i) strengthen links among the key components of a financial system, (ii) 
examine carefully how systemic risk varies over time, and (iii) study the robustness of 
that system when hit by shocks or systemic risk. Excessive risk-taking, combined with a 
lack of prudential supervision and loose monetary policy, are generally viewed as 
important contributors to the global financial crisis (as well as the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis). While financial institutions survive and prosper by taking risks, the risks they take 
must be well-managed. Central banks and regulators have a fundamental role in 
ensuring financial stability by monitoring the performance of banks and other financial 
institutions, but their collective actions were clearly not sufficient to prevent the crisis.  
 
The global financial crisis has also accentuated the importance of systematically 
introducing a macroprudential approach for assessing soundness in financial systems as 
well as in individual financial institutions. Regulators need to identify banks and other 
financial institutions that do not manage their risks well. Such monitoring should not only 
be concerned with the stability of individual institutions, but should also include a 
macroprudential orientation that comprises monitoring, regulation, and supervision to 
examine how risk is distributed across a financial system at any given point in time, and 
identify and address how aggregate risk evolves over time. However, although the need 
for a macroprudential approach has heightened over the past 15 years, the 
macroprudential toolbox is still in the process of development and its concepts are as 
complex as they are poorly understood.54 In addition, a macroprudential approach needs 
to be flexible to take into consideration the changing dynamics of the global financial 
system and regional financial markets.  
 
A macroprudential approach can be viewed as being two-dimensional—cross-sectional 
and time-dimensional—with implications for monitoring financial system soundness, the 
calibration of prudential tools,55 and ultimately, the regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions. It provides a framework to monitor, examine, and address risks to financial 
stability. One purpose for monitoring would be to aid in the early detection and timely 
recognition of financial vulnerabilities across financial instruments, financial markets, and 
financial institutions, thus alerting supervisory and regulatory authorities and the financial 
industry. Another would be to assess the likely consequences for financial stability and 
                                                 
53 G20 (2010), p. 5 and 17. 
54 For a detailed discussion, see Schou-Zibell, Albert, and Song (2010). 
55 Existing prudential tools such as risk-weighted capital requirements, as exemplified by Basel II, are 
already supposed to ensure that high risks demand higher capital. The problem, however, was that 
regulators' measurements were error prone. 
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the risk of failure of individual institutions, which would be helpful for assisting financial 
market supervisors and regulators to formulate and implement remedial actions that 
allow businesses to adjust their strategies and limit significant real economic losses. 
Such a system-wide approach provides an analytical tool for linking macroeconomic 
development, risk-taking, and financial system stability.  
 
Across economies, examinations have been undertaken of macroeconomic and financial 
soundness indicators (FSIs) that are useful for a macroprudential approach, especially 
for the purpose of regularly identifying coincidental and leading signals of financial 
vulnerability. Cross-country studies have also been carried out, but with difficulties owing 
to data issues (e.g., inherent differences in data sets, definitions of indicators, frequency 
and accuracy of data) and to the widely diverse stages of development of the financial 
systems being studied. FSIs are also mainly backward-looking indicators (as opposed to 
forward-looking). In addition, higher frequency data are generally more desirable to have 
for monitoring and evaluation of a financial system since higher frequency data can 
better foreshadow emerging vulnerabilities than the annual aggregate FSI data generally 
used to date.56 Capturing systemic risk through indicators and through supervision and 
regulation thus requires an assessment of financial stability using a range of approaches 
and indicators. It also requires the integration of the various perspectives of market 
participants—supervisors, regulators, rating agencies, risk managers, economists, and 
many other stakeholders—to take a holistic view of the financial system. 
 
Macroprudential monitoring examines trends in the economy and the financial system as 
a whole that can impact financial stability and trigger large-scale financial crises. With 
larger institutions, greater competition across market segments, and the growing 
importance of capital markets, interrelationships among individual institutions and their 
products and markets need to be examined in the context of the risks that the largest 
financial institutions (of whatever label) pose to the overall financial system. With 
microprudential stability being neither necessary nor sufficient for macroeconomic and 
financial stability, macroprudential supervision is concerned with encouraging financial 
institutions to behave in a different way in instances when taking a risk that may be 
considered prudent behavior for a single institution could be destabilizing if the same risk 
were taken by a number of institutions.  
 
4.2.1 Developing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision  
 
The macroprudential approach to supervision should complement and reinforce 
monetary policy in sustaining economic growth. Maintaining medium- to long-term price 
stability is usually considered to be the overarching objective of monetary policy. Price 
stability, in general, promotes financial stability by anchoring inflationary expectations, 
which reduces the risk of deflation and helps stabilize economic activity. Monetary policy 
has been particularly relevant in stabilizing financial sectors around the world in 
response to the global financial crisis. On the other hand, a sound financial system can 
contribute to price stability and macroeconomic stability by facilitating the transmission of 
monetary policy actions and cushioning the impact of macroeconomic shocks through 
the financial sector. In addition, a stable and sound financial system decreases the 
incidence of financial stress and crises, and leads to less disruption to economic activity, 
                                                 
56 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is developing through its Data Link Project a set of timely and 
higher-frequency indicators for, at least initially, systemically important countries. 
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which contributes to price stability. In the wake of the global financial crisis, many 
policymakers and commentators have suggested that central banks should pay more 
attention to the financial sector and financial excesses, and, where such is not already 
the case, take on financial stability as a statutory objective or guiding principle. 
Nonetheless, it is also true that those who have recognized this have by no means been 
immune to the crisis. At the very least, an explicit financial stability objective for central 
banks as well as regulatory agencies would highlight stability as an area of responsibility 
and provide a mechanism for accountability. 
 
In addition, there may be trade-offs between price and financial stability in certain 
circumstances, as shown by the global financial crisis. High growth and low inflation and 
interest rates in the 2 decades preceding the crisis, which has come to be known as the 
Great Moderation, created an environment that encouraged increased risk-taking and 
leverage, and subsequently supported the development of the asset bubbles that 
underlay the crisis. In this environment, policymakers must balance between future 
financial stability and present price stability. The first half of 2008 also created another 
dilemma for central banks in many economies as inflation around the world rose due to 
high oil and commodity prices, while at the same time financial stability was in jeopardy 
as major economies were experiencing a credit crunch due to the bursting of the 
housing bubble in the US. In this environment, maintaining price stability would have 
aggravated financial instability.57 
 
According to Tinbergen’s principle58 relating the number of instruments to the number of 
policy objectives, monetary policy tools may not be useful in targeting financial stability. 
Policymakers need additional tools other than the interest rate, particularly when there 
are trade-offs between policy objectives. Interest rate policy may be too powerful and 
blunt to address financial stability. Factors affecting financial stability, such as asset 
price bubbles, may require a major change in the interest rate, which would cause 
material damage to other parts of the economy. Macroprudential policy tools—such as 
capital requirements, additional capital buffers for banks, guidance regarding leverage 
ratios, liquidity management of financial institutions, and limits on lending (especially 
loan-to-value ratios)—may be more appropriate. However, applying additional capital 
requirements for macroeconomic reasons that are not directly related to individual 
financial institutions is not a straightforward process and would have feedback effects on 
interest rates and thus monetary policy. While there is a growing consensus that 
monetary policy may also have a role to play in maintaining financial stability by leaning 
against asset bubbles,59 the rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets—resulting 
from their intervention on behalf of systemically important institutions that were under 
particular liquidity stress—risks compromising price stability.  
 
The rapid build-up of central bank balance sheets in response to the global financial 
crisis came about as a result of both standard and innovative tools used to supply 
liquidity. Central banks acting in their traditional role as lender of last resort had to adapt 
                                                 
57 Many central banks also ignored inflation when it was high but did not ignore it when it was low for 
structural reasons and when tight monetary policy may have been the better option. 
58 Tinbergen's principle is concerned with the existence and location of a solution to the system. It does 
not assert that any given set of policy responses will, in fact, lead to that solution. To assert this, it is 
necessary to investigate the stability properties of a dynamic system.  
59 White (2009), Davies (2009), Yellen (2009). 
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radically in order to (i) lend at longer maturities; (ii) accept a broader range of non-
traditional collateral; and (iii) lend to non-traditional counterparties, especially investment 
banks. In addition, price stability can be compromised by expanded balance sheets as (i) 
large excess reserves can result in rapid credit growth and inflationary pressure, (ii) 
certain assets can be hard to use for monetary policy and liquidity management, (iii) a 
reliance on quantitative tools might make it difficult to judge the stance of monetary 
policy, and (iv) losses and quasi-fiscal operations can lead to political pressures that 
undermine central bank independence.60 
 
4.2.2 Coordination and Communication 
 
In addition to the technical difficulties of identifying vulnerabilities lies the challenge for 
any early warning system (EWS), scenario analysis, or stress test: persuading 
policymakers to act upon vulnerabilities once they have been identified. For this, a deep 
understanding of the nature of financial vulnerabilities and ultimately of systemic risk is 
needed. Financial safety net players and fiscal authorities thus need to engage 
policymakers in clear and well-calibrated communication that is established by 
comprehensive evidence that has been carefully weighed and analyzed. Such analysis 
would include not only a description of the underlying sources of financial vulnerability, 
but also the shocks that may cause the vulnerability to unwind and how these shocks 
can be transmitted across institutions, sectors, markets, and economies. Early warnings 
would also need to be accompanied by a clear set of policy options that emphasize the 
trade-offs between addressing different types of risks and underscore the need for 
national, regional, and international policy coordination.61 Fragility in the financial sector 
can also have spillover effects on consumer and investor confidence, capital flows, 
public finances, and financial intermediation. 
 
While close coordination and cooperation among financial safety net players, fiscal 
authorities, and policy makers is necessary, conflicting mandates could undermine the 
effectiveness of handling financial vulnerabilities, especially when the need to handle 
financial institution failures arises. Although the precise mechanisms of coordination will 
depend on each respective economy’s institutional structure, there should be a clearly 
articulated division of powers and responsibilities agreed upon by the participants to 
prevent, as much as possible, unproductive overlapping and duplication of activities.  
 
The need for coordination and cooperation does not stop at the national level. The global 
financial crisis proved once again that coordination and cooperation are mandatory at 
the national, regional, and global levels when responding to systemic problems. Reform 
proposals and detailed action plans have emerged in various global fora. However, there 
are huge gaps between declarations of reform policies and their actual implementation. 
Additional cooperation is required to ensure regional and global financial stability. To 
strengthen financial systems with appropriate macroprudential oversight and extend 
supervision over a wider set of market segments and institutions, especially those 
deemed systemically important, policymakers from around the region and the world will 
need to work together. It is also important that Asia actively participates in the reform 
process to ensure that the new financial architecture matches the needs of globalized 
finance with the region’s financial development agenda. 
                                                 
60 Cottarelli and Vinals (2009). 
61 Ghosh, Ostry, and Tamirisa (2009).  
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In addition to systematically introducing a macroprudential approach to the supervisory 
framework, ASEAN+3 encourages greater cooperation in monitoring and surveillance. 
One positive example of regional cooperation is the expansion and multilateralization of 
the ASEAN+3 CMIM reserve pool. This initiative includes the establishment of an 
independent regional surveillance mechanism to support the reserve pooling 
mechanism. This will initially involve expanding current ADB and ASEAN Secretariat 
work that objectively monitors economic performance and assesses financial 
vulnerabilities. The negotiated institutional structure approved by the 13 members of 
ASEAN+3 could provide the basis for future rules-based regional institutions. 
 
To further strengthen cooperation and ensure regional and global financial stability, 
discussions are on-going in respect to the establishment of a high-level AFSD which 
would include officials from finance ministries and central banks, as well as other 
financial regulators and supervisors. The AFSD could coordinate supervisory and 
regulatory developments and monitor potential financial vulnerabilities through the use of 
an objective EWS and other mechanisms, and engage the private sector in financial 
market development.  
 
Lessons can also be drawn from Europe’s response to the current situation where 
several new EU institutions are being established for systemic risk.62 These include two 
new pillars of the EU framework: (i) the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is 
macroprudential in focus; and (ii) the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), 
which is microprudential in focus. The new EU institutions will coordinate with 
international institutions such as the IMF and the FSB, as well as coordinate with 
national institutions. 
 
4.3 Designing Effective Regulatory and Supervisory Systems 
 
In addressing the scope and coverage of regulation, in addition to macroprudential 
supervision, a second challenge is the overarching design and structure of the financial 
regulatory and supervisory system, and its ability to adequately address gaps and 
reduce the potential for regulatory arbitrage. In the context of the financial stability issues 
which arose during the global financial crisis, given that many issues arose from 
regulatory gaps and divisions, an important aspect is to consider the system in a broad 
and integrated way. In this context, Asian jurisdictions would benefit from an in-depth 
analysis of the structure and coverage of their respective regulatory systems. Beyond 
domestic reviews, regional and international reviews would also be beneficial—at the 
international level through the IMF–World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) 63  and/or the FSB, and at the regional level through ADB or other regional 
organizations such as the emerging AFSD. 
 
Overall, a number of lessons have emerged in relation to regulatory design.64 First, 
individual jurisdictions must examine the advantages and disadvantages of possible 
                                                 
62 For discussion, see Andenas, Arner, and Leung (2010). For application of the EU experience in the 
context of Asia, see Arner, Lejot, and Wang (2009). 
63 ADB participated for the first time in a banking sector vulnerability assessment in June 2010. The 
assessment was for the Republic of Georgia. 
64 For a detailed discussion, see Arner and Lin (2003). 
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change, including the risks inherent in the change process. Second, a number of basic 
structures are possible including the traditional sectoral model (with separate regulators 
for each financial sector—banking, securities, and insurance—often combined with strict 
separation or holding company structures for financial conglomerates); the functional 
model (with separate regulators for each regulatory function—financial stability, 
prudential, market conduct, and competition regulation—catering to financial 
conglomerates and product innovation); the institutional structure (with separate 
regulators for different types of financial institutions, most typically adopted in the context 
of banks with operations in multiple sectors such as securities and insurance); and the 
integrated structure (with one or more sectors andor functions combined in a single 
agency, often combined with a universal banking model for financial services 
provision).65 It cannot be taken for granted that a particular model is better than any 
other; this depends on particular circumstances of the jurisdiction.  
 
Under the integrated or single regulator structure, an economy has a single financial 
regulator responsible for all aspects of the financial system and financial supervision. 
This model has been adopted in for example the UK (Financial Services Agency 
[FSA]),66 Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority [FSA], Japan (Financial Supervisory 
Agency [FSA]) and Singapore (Monetary Authority of Singapore [MAS]).67 This model is 
generally seen to integrate well with universal banking, but can also work with other 
structures of financial intermediary activities and financial conglomerates. While this 
model appeared to be gaining in prominence prior to the global financial crisis, this may 
no longer be the case, with arguments suggesting its main weaknesses may be an 
excess of objectives and coverage since a financial regulator that does everything may 
not do anything well. 
 
                                                 
65 For a detailed discussion of major models and their implementation in various jurisdictions, see Arner 
and Lin (2003). This analytical division is generally used outside the US as well as by the IMF. For an 
alternative framework of analysis (adopted in the US), see Group of 30 (2008). Under the G30–US 
framework, there are also four models (i) functional, (ii) institutional, (iii) twin peaks, and (iv) integrated. 
Under this framework, the functional model is largely equivalent to the more generally-used sectoral 
model. The institutional model is largely equivalent to the more generally-used functional model. The 
integrated and twin peaks models are equivalent in both the US–G30 and international–IMF 
formulations. The G30–US framework does not have an equivalent to the international–IMF functional 
approach. To further complicate matters, in its recent review of regulatory reform options, the US 
Treasury suggested there are four main options: (i) institutionally-based functional regulation (the 
current US model), (ii) activities-based functional regulation (a model based on regulators assigned 
specific functions within the financial system), (iii) consolidated regulation (the model in the UK), and 
(iv) objectives-based regulation (the model in Australia). As a result, the definition of that terminology 
being used is of significant importance in this context. See US Department of the Treasury (2008), p. 
138-42. 
66 The British government has recently announced that it will be moving towards a twin peaks system, 
with prudential responsibilities shifted to the Bank of England. 
67 In both the UK and Japan, the FSA is a separate agency from the central bank—the Bank of England 
and Bank of Japan, respectively. In this structure, the central bank is responsible for monetary policy 
and financial stability, while the FSA is responsible for financial regulation. The UK has also adopted a 
single statutory framework for the FSA and financial regulation, the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000. In Japan, there are separate statutes dealing with individual financial sectors—banking, 
securities, insurance—but administered by the FSA. In Singapore, the MAS combines the roles of 
central bank and financial regulator. The statutory framework in Singapore comprises individual laws 
for each major sector, administered by the MAS. 
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Under the sectoral regulation model, an economy has separate regulators for each 
financial sector (typically, banking, securities, and insurance). This model has been 
adopted in the majority of economies around the world, including the US and PRC.68 
This model works best with a system of strict sectoral separation of financial 
intermediary activities. It is also often used in economies which have adopted the 
financial holding company model or the parent–subsidiary model. It does not work well 
with universal banking models. The recent experience of the US highlights that it may 
also not be ideal in the context of financial holding company models, due to potential 
difficulties in coordination and coverage. In addition, in financial sectors where cross-
sectoral activities are allowed and traditional distinctions between markets, institutions, 
and products are blurred, such structures arguably provide potential for significant 
regulatory arbitrage and gaps in coverage. 
 
Under the functional regulation model, an economy has separate regulators for separate 
functions, including (i) financial stability regulation, (ii) prudential regulation of financial 
intermediary safety and soundness, (iii) financial market conduct, and (iv) competition. 
This model has been adopted in Australia and Canada (with some variations), two of the 
developed countries which have not experienced serious financial sector problems in the 
recent crisis.69 Arguments in favor of this model suggest that clear objectives enhance 
regulatory performance and accountability. 
 
Financial stability regulation and prudential regulation are often combined in a single 
agency, with a separate agency responsible for financial market conduct (e.g., the twin 
peaks approach). 70 This model can work with any model of financial intermediary 
activities and financial conglomerate structure. It has been adopted in the Netherlands 
and France. In the wake of the global financial crisis increasing attention is being placed 
on the twin peaks structure due to failures in the single regulator approach in for 
example the UK and the sectoral approach in the US,. It is to be adopted in the UK71 and 
it is being considered in Hong Kong, China.72  
 
Under the institutional regulation model, all activities of a given type of financial 
intermediary are regulated by one regulator, regardless of the specific type of activity 
                                                 
68 The PRC has the clearest examples: People’s Bank of China (central bank), China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (responsible for banking regulation), China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(responsible for securities regulation), and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (responsible 
for insurance regulation). Each regulator is established under and responsible for a separate statutory 
framework, with cross-sectoral activities generally prohibited, though increasingly being allowed, 
especially between banks and securities activities. For a detailed discussion, see Barth et al. (2006). 
The US regulatory system is exceptionally complex and this complexity and resulting overlaps and 
gaps in jurisdiction are now regarded as significant contributors to the subprime crisis. See US 
Department of the Treasury (2008). 
69 In Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) as the central bank is responsible for monetary 
policy and financial stability, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Agency (APRA) is responsible for 
regulating the safety and soundness of all significant financial institutions, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission is responsible for market conduct and financial product regulation, and the 
Australian Competition Commission is responsible for competition and antitrust. 
 
70 See Taylor (1995). 
71 See US Department of the Treasury (2008). 
72 See Arner, Hsu, and Da Roza (2010). 
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being undertaken. This model has not been adopted anywhere on a system-wide basis; 
however, it is frequently adopted for banking regulation, in which all activities banks, 
regardless of their nature, are regulated by the banking regulator through consolidated 
supervision. The most common structure resulting from the special systemic risks posed 
by banks and their activities, whether financial or non-financial, cross-sectoral or not, is 
regulation by the banking regulator, usually the central bank, with the balance of 
regulatory responsibility allocated on a sectoral basis. This is the traditional structure 
which has been developed in many jurisdictions, including across Asia. This model has 
the advantage of centralizing regulation and a lender of last resort in a single institution. 
In addition, in Asia, where the majority of financial systems are centered around banks, it 
provides a centralization of expertise focused on the institutions which have traditionally 
been viewed as the greatest source of potential systemic risk. At the same time, as 
financial systems develop and other institutions emerge, additional sources of systemic 
risk may arise beyond the banking system, as was the case in Thailand during the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis. 
 
There is no general consensus on which model is best. However, there is an important 
relationship among regulatory structure (and attendant financial and human resources), 
financial structure (the relative importance of banking, insurance, and capital markets 
and the level of financial development), and the structure of financial institutions (e.g., 
strict separation of financial sectors versus universal banking). The fundamental issue is 
how to appropriately tailor an economy’s financial regulatory structure to its own 
circumstances and structure for addressing financial intermediary activities and financial 
conglomerates. To the extent that systemically important financial institutions, 
instruments, and markets are unregulated, or opportunities for regulatory arbitrage exist, 
the potential risks for future instability increase. 
 
With this in mind, regulatory structure must be designed to coincide with an economy’s 
financial structure. 73  There must be full coverage of the intermediaries (especially 
financial conglomerates), functions, and risks inherent in a given financial system, in 
such manner that coincides with the history, culture, legal system, and level of financial 
development of that economy. An additional risk involves financial structure and 
regulatory design—a potential financial and regulatory mismatch. The risk is that a 
jurisdiction’s financial regulatory structure will not equate with the structure of its financial 
sector; financial intermediaries will be organized on a basis not appropriately addressed 
by the regulatory structure. In such circumstances, it is possible that significant risks may 
develop through financial intermediary operations which are not supervised by the 
existing structure. For example, in a financial system requiring strict separation of 
financial institutions and activity across sectors (e.g., the US Glass–Steagall model or 
the model until recently in use in the PRC), informal financial groups may develop that 
are regulated not on a group basis, but rather on a sectoral institutional basis, leaving 
the financial system exposed to the risks of the group. 
 
Finally, a key issue highlighted in systems in which the regulatory functions are 
separated from the central bank is coordination, especially in the context of 
macroprudential supervision and liquidity provision. In economies where these functions 
are separated, the global financial crisis has underlined an absolutely fundamental need 
                                                 
73 For a full discussion of financial structure, see Arner (2007). 
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for robust information-sharing and coordination arrangements, especially in times of 
crisis. 
 
To date, international consensus and guidance on structural issues has been limited, 
with design being a domestic matter. Following G20 directions, in September 2009, 
IOSCO released guidance related to unregulated financial markets and products.74 In 
October 2009, the IMF and FSB discussed information gaps in regulation, including 
those resulting from regulatory design.75 
 
Most significantly, in January 2010, the Joint Forum—comprising the BCBS, IOSCO, 
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)—released an initial 
review of related issues. 76  The Joint Forum emphasized four fundamental guiding 
principles: (i) similar activities, products and markets should be subject to similar 
minimum supervision and regulation; (ii) consistency is necessary, however, legitimate 
differences can exist across sectors; (iii) supervision and regulation should consider the 
risks posed, particularly any systemic risk, which may arise not only in large financial 
institutions, but also through interactions and interconnectedness among institutions of 
all sizes; and (iv) consistent implementation of international standards is critical to avoid 
competitive issues and regulatory arbitrage. In supporting these principles, the review 
focused on 17 recommendations in five areas: (i) key regulatory differences across the 
banking, securities, and insurance sectors; (ii) supervision and regulation of financial 
groups; (iii) mortgage orientation; (iv) hedge funds; and (v) credit risk transfer products.  
 
In relation to reducing regulatory differences, the Joint Forum’s recommendations 
included (i) consistency across sectoral financial principles (e.g., the BCBS Core 
Principles of Effective Banking Supervision) and organizations (e.g., the BCBS, IOSCO, 
IAIS, and IASB), (ii) development of uniform capital standards for insurance and 
securities similar to those for banking, and (iii) development of cross-sectoral standards 
as necessary (e.g., in relation to mortgage origination and credit risk transfer).  
 
In relation to financial groups, recommendations focused on ensuring that all financial 
groups, particularly those operating cross-border, are subject to comprehensive 
regulation and supervision on the basis of updated international standards addressing 
conglomerates, and that supervisory colleges operate consistently across sectors and 
cross-sectoral issues are appropriately addressed. 
 
Given the central role of regulatory gaps and regulatory arbitrage in the global financial 
crisis, these are issues that are likely to be central to future IMF and FSB regulatory 
reviews, and hence a key focus for Asian jurisdictions, especially G20 and FSB 
members. In Asia, particular concerns arise in the context of complex financial groups of 
systemic significance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 IOSCO (2009f). 
75 IMF and FSB (2009). 
76 Joint Forum (2010). 
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5. Pillar III: Addressing Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions and Financial Institution Resolution  
 
In June 2010, the G20 identified addressing systemically important financial institutions 
and financial institution resolution as the third pillar of its financial regulatory reform 
agenda. 77  Globally, the financial crisis has highlighted that in addition to effective 
monetary policy frameworks, economies must have in place effective financial stability 
arrangements, extending crisis resolution as well as prevention. At the early stages of 
the recent crisis, the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve found themselves 
less effectively equipped in the context of liquidity provision than the European Central 
Bank, with both the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve forced to dramatically 
extend their existing arrangements to non-traditional institutions and collateral. Clearly, 
Asian economies must review existing liquidity provision arrangements to address 
coverage, scope (especially relating to collateral availability), moral hazard, and 
coordination across financial agencies as well as regionally and internationally. In 
relation to government intervention, Asian governments have had to intervene to a 
lesser extent than those of the US and Europe, but based on experiences in the Asian 
financial crisis, planning in advance, especially for the failure of major financial 
institutions—whether domestic or foreign—is necessary. In this context, there needs to 
be in place a comprehensive financial sector safety net, including a contingency plan, to 
address the failure of any financial institution operating within a given economy, as well 
as consumer protection measures such as deposit insurance. 
 
5.1 Cross-border and Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
 
Cross-border and systemically important financial institutions—non-bank financial 
institutions such as investment banks, insurance companies, and the shadow banking 
system of conduits; and SIVs—were at the heart of the global financial crisis. Around the 
world, a key lesson of the crisis is the need for appropriate regulatory and supervisory 
arrangements for such institutions, especially large complex global financial institutions, 
regardless of their form. 
 
In relation to cross-border and systemically important financial institutions, in November 
2008, G20 leaders agreed to (i) establish supervisory colleges for significant cross-
border firms; (ii) implement the FSB principles for cross-border crisis management and 
ensure that home authorities of each major international financial institution with a 
common interest in that financial institution meet at least annually; (iii) support continued 
efforts by the IMF, FSB, World Bank, and BCBS to develop an international framework 
for cross-border bank resolution arrangements; and (iv) continue to cooperate on the 
subject of exit strategies.  
 
In their April 2009 meetings, the G20 and FSF addressed these issues in detail, building 
upon previous agreements in most cases and in some cases going further, with G20 
leaders stating in their communiqué that "[m]ajor failures in the financial sector and in 
financial regulation and supervision were fundamental causes of the crisis," 78  and 
                                                 
77 G20 (2010), p. 5. 
78 G20 (2009c), para 13. 
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committing "to extend regulation and oversight to all systemically important financial 
institutions, instruments, and markets".79 
 
In an annex to the April 2009 London communiqué in support of these general principles, 
the G20 established an outline of approaches going forward, with the FSB80 tasked, inter 
alia, to "set guidelines for, and support the establishment, functioning of, and 
participation in, supervisory colleges, including through ongoing identification of the most 
systemically important cross-border firms" and to "support contingency planning for 
cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to systemically important 
firms,"81 including "to support continued efforts by the IMF, FSB, World Bank, and BCBS 
to develop an international framework for cross-border bank resolution arrangements."82 
At the same time, reflecting that such efforts are in most cases still at an early stage, the 
G20 recognized "the importance of further work and international cooperation on the 
subject of exit strategies."83 
 
In respect of large complex financial institutions, the G20 confirmed that "large and 
complex financial institutions require particularly careful oversight given their systemic 
importance", 84  reflecting the conclusions of a supporting working group chaired by 
Canada and India.85 In this respect, the working group concluded that "[l]arge complex 
financial institutions require particularly robust oversight given their systemic importance, 
which arises in part from their size and interconnectedness (or correlation) with other 
institutions, and from their influence on markets." The G20 assigned responsibility to the 
FSB and prudential supervisors at all levels—domestic, regional, and international.86  
 
The FSB has focused on three aspects: (i) reducing the probability and impact of failure 
through regulation and supervision, (ii) improving resolution capacity and preparedness, 
and (iii) strengthening core financial infrastructure and markets.87 As an initial step, the 
IMF, BIS, and FSB have developed guidance on assessing the systemic importance of 
financial institutions, markets, and instruments, 88  addressing questions relating to 
systemically important institutions as well as macroprudential considerations. In addition, 
the IMF and FSB have analyzed information gaps in cross-border institutions and their 
supervision.89 Supervisory colleges have been the major mechanism to be adopted, with 
                                                 
79 Ibid., para 15. 
80 FSF Press Release (2009c). As part of the process, the FSB’s mandate was reconstituted to include, 
inter alia, to ―set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges‖ and ―manage 
contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to systemically 
important firms.‖ Ibid., para 9. 
81 G20 (2009e), p. 1.  
82 Ibid., p. 2. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 G20 (2009a), p. ii.  
86 Ibid., p. xii. 
87 FSB (2009b), p. 9. 
88 IMF, BIS, and FSB (2009). 
89 IMF and FSB (2009) 
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such arrangements established for more than 30 large complex financial conglomerates 
and coordinated through the FSB, with similar arrangements being developed through 
European bodies for European systemically important financial institutions.90 In addition, 
institution-specific recovery and rapid resolution plans, known as living wills, will be 
developed by end-2010.91  
 
In June 2010, the FSB released an initial report on reducing moral hazard risks posed by 
systemically important financial institutions.92 Further, in June 2010, the G20 tasked the 
FSB to develop recommendations to address problems associated with and resolve 
systemically important financial institutions, including financial sector responsibilities for 
associated costs.93  
 
In Asia, as financial institutions continue to regionalize their operations in the wake of the 
global financial crisis and continued economic development and integration, questions of 
regional colleges will gain merit, as will treatment of Asian institutions through 
international arrangements. 
 
More significantly, common with many markets around the world (the major exception 
historically being the US), most jurisdictions in Asia have concentrated banking systems, 
with a small number of banks dominating most markets. In addition, Asia is dominated 
by bank-centered financial systems, which increases the concentration of risks (arising 
from simultaneous shocks) in individual financial systems and across the region, as was 
the case during the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, these 
dominant banks have close connections with the state, making any potential problems 
arising in such institutions both economically and politically significant. Such dominant 
and systemically important institutions raise not only special concerns for financial 
stability but also in the context of moral hazard, given their significance and 
interconnection, economically and politically. Such issues were central to the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis and indicate that regulation and supervision, especially of 
dominant banks in individual economies in Asia, are of significant and continuing 
concern, and rate the highest level of attention from both domestic regulators and 
regional cooperative mechanisms. 
 
Beyond major banks, the Asian financial crisis also highlighted the risks of systemically 
significant non-bank financial institutions in Asia, underlining the significance of effective 
macroprudential arrangements and well-designed regulatory structure, as well as the 
                                                 
90 FSB (2009b), p. 13. The BCBS has developed draft guidance on supervisory colleges. BCBS (2010b).  
91 G20 (2010), p. 18. 
92 FSB (2010f). 
93 G20 (2010), p. 5 and 18. According to the FSB report (2010f), guidance will be built on the following 
principles: (i) all jurisdictions should have in place a policy framework to reduce the moral hazard risks 
associated with systemically important financial institutions in their jurisdictions, (ii) all jurisdictions 
should have effective resolution tools that enable authorities to resolve firms without systemic 
disruptions and without taxpayer losses, (iii) all jurisdictions should have the capacity to impose 
prudential requirements on firms commensurate with their systemic importance, (iv) all national 
supervisory authorities should have the powers to apply differentiated supervision requirements for 
institutions based on the risk they pose to the financial system, (v) all jurisdictions should put in place 
or strengthen core financial market infrastructure to reduce contagion risk upon a firm’s failure and 
encourage their use, and (vi) FSB members will establish an ongoing peer review process to promote 
national policies to address the risks associated with systemically important financial institutions . 
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need for making sure that any systemically important financial institution in the region is 
subject to appropriate and effective regulation and supervision, regardless of its legal 
form.  
 
In the context of systemically important banks and other financial institutions, especially 
those with government involvement, individual jurisdictions will have to carefully consider 
the sorts of risks that such institutions will be allowed to undertake. Internationally, 
related debate currently centers around the proposal in the US, known as the Volcker 
Rule, to limit trading activities of banks. While it is arguable that a Volcker Rule 
prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary trading would not, in fact, have prevented 
the global financial crisis (and this argument in all likelihood even extends as far as the 
pre-1999 US separation between banking and securities in the context of the Glass– 
Steagall system), jurisdictions in Asia will need to carefully balance the sophistication of 
their major banks and other financial institutions, level of development of their markets 
(especially in terms of cross-sectoral activities), effectiveness of their regulatory and 
supervisory arrangements and, most importantly, personnel. 
 
A second emerging issue concerns financial sector contributions for government 
support. In June 2010, the IMF outlined a range of options and approaches.94 One 
approach is a levy on financial institutions. Such a levy could be used as an incentive for 
financial institutions to remain below a certain systemically significant size. It could also 
be a mechanism of pre-funding resolution arrangements or as a source of general 
government revenue. Other alternatives include a range of transaction taxes to reduce 
the profitability of certain speculative financial activities. In June 2010, the G20 agreed 
that the financial sector should make a "fair and substantial contribution" towards paying 
for any burdens associated with government interventions to repair the financial system 
or fund resolution. 95  While there was no agreement to adopt a single international 
approach, the G20 did agree to five guiding principles for any approach: (i) protect 
taxpayers, (ii) reduce risks arising from the financial system, (iii) protect the flow of credit 
in good and bad times, (iv) take into account an individual country’s circumstances and 
options, and (v) help promote a level playing field. 
 
Although no single arrangement has been adopted internationally, such arrangements 
are being considered at the regional level, as is the case in Europe, and could be 
considered in ASEAN+3. 
 
The global financial crisis has shown that not only domestic institutions pose potential 
systemic risk but also foreign financial institutions—whether banks or otherwise. Foreign 
institutions therefore must also be subject to appropriate regulation and supervision in 
each jurisdiction in which they operate, across regions in which they are potentially 
systemically important, as well as globally, with regulatory colleges being an appropriate 
starting point for such institutions at each level: domestic, regional, and international. In 
the context of regional colleges, an AFSD could play the central coordinating role.  
 
 
 
                                                 
94 IMF (2010a). 
95 G20 (2010), p. 18. 
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5.2 Liquidity Arrangements 
 
Liquidity arrangements were central to addressing the systemic phase of the global 
financial crisis, including domestic measures (especially in the US and UK), regional 
measures (through the European Central Bank), and international measures (primarily 
through bilateral swap lines from the US Federal Reserve). 
 
There is a mixture of implicit and explicit structures for liquidity provision, which prior to 
the crisis was generally referred to in the context of a lender of last resort. In most cases, 
the lender of last resort is the central bank, but in some cases it can be the deposit 
insurance authority, usually in conjunction with the central bank. 
 
Under the prevailing pre-crisis formulation, the provision of liquidity support in the 
context of lender of last resort operations generally followed the following rules: (i) 
support should only be provided to temporarily illiquid but solvent banks; (ii) support 
should be provided freely but at penalty interest; (iii) support should be provided to 
anyone with good collateral who meets both rules (i) and (ii); (iv) the lender of last resort 
should clearly indicate its readiness to lend ex ante, (v) nonetheless, the decision to 
provide support should remain discretionary, and (vi) this discretion should be based 
upon the test of the existence of potential systemic risk. 
 
Based on experiences during the global financial crisis, there were two main 
weaknesses in this formulation and its operation. First, although Bagehot’s original 
formulation was not explicitly limited to banks, as practiced up to the global financial 
crisis, the general rule applied by central banks operating as lenders of last resort was to 
limit the availability of support to systemically significant banks. In retrospect, this 
formulation, when tied to the regulatory focus on banks rather than all systemically 
significant institutions and markets, made responses to the initial stages of the crisis 
difficult, especially in the US. In Asia and elsewhere, lender of last resort support 
(perhaps more appropriately: liquidity provider of last resort) needs to be available 
across the financial system to any illiquid but solvent and systemically significant 
financial institution or market. 
 
Beyond this central issue, liquidity provision was also limited by a range of legal and 
institutional factors. While the lender of last resort is typically not thought of in terms of 
legal issues, in fact, the formulation is clearly based upon the presupposition of a 
functioning legal system supporting financial transactions, as well as upon an effective 
regulatory and supervisory process.  
 
In the context of eligible institutions and markets, certainly the US Federal Reserve was 
limited in its ability to extend assistance beyond regulated banks by its legal framework. 
"Temporarily illiquid but solvent" requires two sets of preconditions: (i) supervisory 
information in order to determine the respective condition; and (ii) a definition of 
insolvency, which is generally the result of a public policy choice enshrined in insolvency 
legislation. "Freely but at penalty interest," fortunately, is relatively self-sufficient, except 
that the liquidity provider must have the ability to provide potentially unlimited support, 
which will often only be available through control over the monetary supply of the 
relevant currency—another issue which arose in the context of the global financial crisis 
and eventually required the creation of extensive swap lines by the US Federal Reserve 
and others. ―Anyone with good collateral‖ clearly requires both a legal judgment and a 
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qualitative judgment. The legal judgment is based upon the ability to take collateral—
different legal systems vary greatly on this point. "Readiness to lend ex ante" requires a 
legal system that supports lending, which is very much determined by the respective 
system of private law. The remaining two criteria simply require an effective system of 
information gathering on the part of the liquidity provider in order to make the respective 
determination. If that system were perfect, of course, there would be no need for the 
support in the first place. 
 
Based on experiences during the global financial crisis, it is clear that financial 
authorities should develop appropriate systems of liquidity support for financial 
institutions and the financial system generally. As such, the legal foundation for liquidity 
provision needs to be carefully considered in each jurisdiction in the context of regulatory 
arrangements, macroprudential systems and financial structure. More specifically, both 
the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve during the crisis faced specific 
limitations as a result of pre-existing collateral policies and related legal frameworks 
which especially limited the Bank of England in liquidity provision at key points in the 
early stages of the crisis. In contrast, the European Central Bank in the years prior to the 
crisis had spent considerable effort in supporting the development of effective collateral 
legal frameworks across the euro area, meaning that during the crisis it could more 
easily draw upon alternative sources and mechanisms for collateralizing liquidity 
support. While there are significant potential benefits of effective collateral legal 
frameworks to financial sector development96 from the standpoint of financial stability, 
Asian central banks would be well-advised to carefully consider potential collateral 
arrangements and underlying legal frameworks—a continuing weakness in many 
jurisdictions across the region.97 Further, given that a number of jurisdictions in Asia 
experienced bank runs during the global financial crisis and many more have 
experienced them in the past 15 years, this is an area of clear concern and relevance in 
the region. 
 
5.3 Deposit Insurance and Investor Protection Arrangements 
 
Like liquidity arrangements, deposit insurance arrangements have been central to 
addressing systemic issues, including in Asia. 
 
In analyzing depositor protection schemes, it is first necessary to place them in the 
appropriate context as one aspect of an overall financial safety net designed to prevent 
systemic risk and maintain financial stability. In general terms, the financial safety net 
has developed out of specific regulatory objectives to form the traditional regulatory and 
supervisory process. In this process, the key authorities and their functions include 
monetary policy authorities, supervisory authorities, liquidity provider of last resort, 
deposit insurance authorities, and insolvency authorities, among others. 
 
Deposit insurance provides a non-contingent guarantee on certain deposits. The liquidity 
provider of last resort, on the other hand, is contingent. The injection of liquidity in times 
of crises is not mandatory, but rather it is subject to the discretion of the central bank or 
other authority. Thus, explicit deposit insurance provides legal certainty regarding the 
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coverage of insured depositors. There is always a degree of uncertainty—some 
economists refer to it as constructive ambiguity—regarding the provision of emergency 
liquidity assistance by the central bank. Also, while explicit deposit insurance protects 
mainly depositors, the liquidity provider of last resort protects mainly the financial system 
and encompasses systemic considerations.  
 
To minimize the risk of moral hazard, it is important to delineate what each institutional 
arrangement can do and what it cannot or should not do. Explicit deposit insurance can 
protect insured depositors, but it cannot—and should not—protect other depositors or 
creditors, shareholders, or managers. Explicit deposit insurance cannot protect insolvent 
banks, because it can only be activated once a bank is closed. The liquidity provider can 
provide emergency liquidity—quick cash up front—over a short period of time, when no 
other sources of funding are readily available. What the central bank should not do is 
lend over an extended period of time or commit funds without the explicit approval of the 
fiscal authority.98  
 
As the starting point, any form of depositor protection can either be implicit or explicit. In 
addition, it is clearly possible for any jurisdiction to have no such system in place at all. 
While some suggest that no system is in fact an implicit government guarantee, it is 
possible—although certainly not politically easy—to not provide government support at 
all. On occasion, governments have managed to stand aside. In most cases, however, 
having no deposit insurance system in place does reflect an implicit government 
guarantee, at least for depositors of the largest financial institutions.  
 
Explicit systems generally take one of two forms: (i) an explicit blanket guarantee of all 
deposits or (ii) an explicit, limited-coverage system of deposit insurance. Each raises a 
variety of issues. 
 
Explicit deposit insurance, such as the creation of a deposit guarantee scheme by law, 
with rules on the extent of the insurance or protection, the scheme, and the type of 
deposits or depositors protected can be a useful instrument of prudential bank 
regulation. Indeed, explicit deposit insurance has traditionally served two purposes: (i) 
consumer protection and (ii) the prevention of bank runs. A third rationale of explicit 
deposit insurance is that it allows the public authorities to close banks more easily, as it 
becomes politically acceptable to liquidate insolvent institutions, in the knowledge that 
less sophisticated depositors are protected.  
 
Under an explicit deposit guarantee scheme, depositors are only paid once the bank is 
closed. Thus, there can be no deposit insurance if the bank remains open. Therefore, 
explicit deposit insurance presupposes that a bank has failed and, hence, it is not 
compatible with the "too big to fail" doctrine—the subject of the preceding discussion 
regarding regulation of systemically important financial institutions.  
 
Implicit deposit insurance, as opposed to explicit deposit insurance, is a blanket 
guarantee for all kinds of depositors (insured and uninsured), other creditors, 
shareholders and even managers. Implicit deposit insurance often presupposes that the 
bank remains in business either because it is too big to fail or because it is politically 
difficult to close the bank, thus creating pervasive moral hazard incentives. While explicit 
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deposit insurance is applied ex post following the closure of a bank, implicit deposit 
insurance is often applied while a bank is still in operation—the government steps in to 
prop up a bank instead of closing the bank.  
 
A well-designed explicit deposit insurance scheme should only inflict limited damage 
upon taxpayers (the current situation of Iceland being a significant heuristic 
counterexample), and, depending on the funding of the scheme, there may be no 
damage at all. However, implicit deposit insurance has the potential of shifting the 
burden onto taxpayers, since rescue packages tend to be financed by the government. 
The use of rescue packages results not only in moral hazard considerations, but might 
also affect competition, especially if applied in the context of systemically significant 
financial institutions. 
 
An explicit blanket guarantee can take either a strict legal form or simply be a 
government pronouncement or policy. Either would likely be sufficiently clear and robust 
for purposes of confidence. The difficulty arises if the government decides to eliminate 
the guarantee and move to an explicit, limited-coverage system of deposit insurance. 
Japan, Korea, and Sweden are among those economies that appear to have made 
successful transitions from blanket guarantees to limited, explicit systems. A range of 
jurisdictions in Asia, including Singapore and Hong Kong, China, will soon face a similar 
challenge. 
 
Explicit deposit insurance is a guarantee limited to one type of preferred creditors— 
insured depositors. Under explicit deposit insurance, uninsured depositors, other 
creditors, shareholders, and managers are not protected. Therefore, explicit deposit 
insurance is more compatible with market discipline, as uninsured depositors and other 
creditors have an interest in monitoring the solvency of the bank while still in operation. 
Explicit deposit insurance must be set at a level that enables national authorities to 
accept the political consequences of bank liquidations—a common problem in 
jurisdictions that have set low levels of explicit protection. 
 
Explicit deposit insurance, by limiting the protection of insured depositors, exposes 
uninsured depositors, general creditors, subordinated debt holders, shareholders, and 
management to increased risk exposure, thereby encouraging them to monitor and limit 
the riskiness of the bank. In the absence of open bank assistance, management will also 
be inclined to run the institution in a prudent manner or risk being removed from office. 
Theoretically, these incentives are very important, particularly in the case of 
shareholders, whose limited liability renders them more prone to lend on a high risk– 
high return basis, while restricting their own exposure through high leverage. However, 
experiences during the global financial crisis have brought into question many views of 
the potential value of such monitoring arrangements.  
 
Recognizing that existing guidance was insufficient, in June 2009, the BCBS and the 
International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), which was established in May 
2002,99 released an extensively revised set of principles for deposit insurance.100 The 
                                                 
99 The IADI is hosted by the BIS but is not presently included in the FSB. There are currently 13 Asian 
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standards, comprising 18 principles in 10 groups, address: (i) setting objectives 
(principles 1–2), (ii) mandates and powers (principles 3–4), (iii) governance (principle 5), 
(iv) relationships with other safety-net participants and cross-border issues (principles 6–
7), (v) membership and coverage (principles 8–10), (vi) funding (principle 11), (vii) public 
awareness (principle 12), (viii) selected legal issues (principles 13–14), (ix) failure 
resolution (principles 15–16), and (x) reimbursing depositors and recoveries (principles 
17–18). 
 
In Asia, initial challenges will be faced by jurisdictions which have put in place blanket 
guarantees. In these jurisdictions, there is a clear necessity to review existing 
arrangements to identify weaknesses which required the use of the blanket guarantee as 
a backstop in the context of the crisis. Based on experiences in the global financial 
crisis, it is likely that many of these weaknesses resulted from inadequate coverage (in 
both banks and non bank-financial institutions) as well as improperly designed payout 
systems, in which depositors faced long delays in payment, thus incentivising runs. In 
relation to the latter, the UK’s experience with Northern Rock and a theoretically 
incentive-enhancing system of shared loss in fact incentivized the bank run. In moving 
from blanket guarantees to improved defined coverage systems, jurisdictions can 
maximize understanding and thereby effectiveness by focusing not only on the design of 
the system, but also on communicating the removal of the guarantee and disseminating 
details of the system. 
 
The experience of Iceland also indicates that actual funding arrangements are central to 
effectiveness of the insurance system and in limiting potential fiscal damage. 
 
Other jurisdictions in Asia still maintain implicit guarantees—often in the financial 
systems with large, systemically important and in some cases government-connected 
banks and other financial institutions. Such jurisdictions should carefully review their 
safety net design in the context of reviewing regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
for systemically significant financial institutions (discussed in section 5). In this context, 
there is a need for careful balancing of reality (large financial institutions will often not be 
allowed to fail) and real moral hazard risks. In jurisdictions where large financial 
institutions are unlikely to be allowed to fail under any circumstances, the corollary is that 
the risks that these institutions undertake must be strictly limited. At the same time, even 
in the context of the largest financial institutions, having in place an explicit system of 
deposit insurance and other compensation arrangements for financial institution 
customers (especially insurance customers) has the potential to enhance incentives of 
management and reduce moral hazard. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Protection Board, Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation, Kazakhstan Deposit Insurance Fund, 
Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation, Philippine Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and Singapore Deposit Insurance Corporation. There are also four Asian 
associate organizations: Bank of Mongolia, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, and Bank of Thailand. The Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) is a partner 
organization. 
100 BCBS and IADI (2009). 
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5.4 Financial Institution Resolution Arrangements 
 
Overall, it is clear that the systemic phase of the current global financial crisis was 
triggered by the failure of large complex global financial conglomerates. In this context, 
as recognized by the G20, one of the greatest failures of both international and domestic 
legal and regulatory systems has been the lack of appropriate arrangements, including 
adequate insolvency arrangements, to address such failures when they occur. Following 
the difficulties experienced in dealing with the failure or near-failure of large complex 
global financial conglomerates such as Lehman Brothers and AIG, the central approach 
is a framework based upon prevention of failure as the first element and mechanisms to 
address failure when they occur as the second. 
 
In the context of financial institution resolution arrangements, the most significant 
element is the increased focus on mechanisms to address failure of financial institutions 
operating on a cross-border basis—a problem that is not easy to solve and one which is 
likely to require significant time and effort before a workable approach is reached.101 The 
G20 identified shortcomings in resolution procedures for financial institutions as a 
particular weakness in the context of the crisis: "Existing procedures for resolving 
troubled institutions have been shown to be inadequate when an institution imposes 
substantial systemic risks. In addition, national resolution mechanisms have not been 
effective in some cross-border resolutions." 102  However, the working group did not 
address related issues, leaving such issues to a second G20 working group.103 
 
G20 working group 2, inter alia, recognized the problems posed especially in the cross-
border context and supported on-going work "to develop an international framework for 
cross-border bank resolutions, and to address the issue of ring-fencing and financial 
burden-sharing. "104 In the absence of such arrangements, the working group advocated 
the development of regional resolution systems in the medium-term. 
 
In addition, the FSF released the most significant attempt to date to address issues of 
failure resolution.105 In this set of principles, the FSF stated "[t]he objective of financial 
crisis management is to seek to prevent serious domestic or international financial 
instability that would have an adverse impact on the real economy".106 At the same time, 
the FSF recognized that such financial crisis management "remains a domestic 
competence," albeit one requiring cross-border cooperation.107 
 
In relation to preparation, authorities are to:  
 
[d]evelop common support tools for managing a cross-border financial crisis, 
including these principles: a key data list; a common language for assessing 
                                                 
101 See Arner and Norton (2009). 
102 Ibid., p. v. 
103 G20 (2009b).   
104 Ibid., p. 5, 18-20. 
105 FSF (2009b); see also FSF (2009f). 
106 Ibid., para. 1. 
107 Ibid., para. 2. 
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systemic implications (drawing on those developed by the [EU] and by national 
authorities); a document that authorities can draw on when considering together 
the specific issues that may arise in handling severe stress at specific firms; and 
an experience library, which pools key lessons from different crises.108  
 
In addition, supervisors will meet at least annually through the college framework,109 
share a range of information on large complex financial institutions,110 and ensure that 
firms have internal contingency plans in place.111 
 
In managing financial crises, authorities are to:  
 
[s]trive to find internationally coordinated solutions that take account of the 
impact of the crisis on the financial systems and real economies of other 
economies, drawing on information, arrangements, and plans developed ex-ante. 
These coordinated solutions will most likely be mainly driven by groups of 
authorities of the most directly involved economies.112 
 
In June 2010, G20 leaders committed to "design and implement a system where we 
have the powers and tools to restructure or resolve all types of financial institutions in 
crisis, without taxpayers ultimately bearing the burden". 113  Leaders endorsed the 
recommendations of the BCBS on cross-border bank resolution,114 stating that resolution 
regimes should provide for115 
 
(i) proper allocation of losses to reduce moral hazard and protect taxpayers; 
(ii) continuity of critical financial services, including uninterrupted service for 
insured depositors; 
(iii) credibility of the resolution regime in the market; 
(iv) minimization of contagion;  
(v) advanced planning for orderly resolution and transfer of contractual 
relationships; and  
(vi) effective cooperation and information exchange domestically and among 
jurisdictions in the event of a failure of a cross-border institution. 
 
The recent pronouncements from the G20 and FSB are a very useful start, especially in 
relation to regulation, supervision and contingency planning for financial institution 
                                                 
108 Ibid., para. 3. 
109 Ibid., para. 4. 
110 Ibid., paras 5-6. 
111 Ibid., paras 7-9. 
112 Ibid., para. 11. 
113 G20 (2010), p. 5 and 17. 
114 BCBS (2010c). The 10 recommendations address (i) effective national resolution powers, (ii) 
frameworks for coordinated resolution of financial groups, (iii) convergence of national resolution 
mechanisms, (iv) cross-border effects of national resolution mechanisms, (v) reduction of complexity 
and interconnectedness of group structures and operations, (vi) planning in advance for orderly 
resolution, (vii) cross-border cooperation and information sharing; (viii) strengthening risk mitigation 
mechanisms, (ix) transfer of contractual relationships, and (x) exit strategies and market discipline. 
115 G20 (2010), p. 17-18. 
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failure. However, the statements, reports and principles, while recognizing the problems 
raised by such failures, largely leave actual resolution to domestic authorities. This, 
suggests that in the final analysis, individual jurisdictions will have to carefully consider 
their own arrangements with respect to the potential failure of a large complex financial 
institution operating within their jurisdiction and to take appropriate precautionary actions 
ex ante. Unfortunately, even in the wake of the global financial crisis, while it may be 
possible to develop adequate international arrangements relating to prevention of 
financial institution failure, there is still insufficient consensus in respect of actual 
insolvency arrangements for any international framework to emerge at present. In such a 
context, individual jurisdictions in Asia must act proactively in building preventive 
arrangements based on internationally agreed upon approaches. At the same time, 
there is likely to be a continued lack of arrangements to deal with actual insolvencies of 
large complex financial institutions at the international level. Individual jurisdictions 
should thus separately mandate capitalized subsidiaries that are subject to domestic 
insolvency arrangements for global firms appropriate for the activities being engaged in 
the individual jurisdiction. At present this is the only arrangement capable to some extent 
of limiting the damage in individual jurisdictions resulting from the failure of large 
complex cross-border financial institutions. 
 
 
6. Pillar IV: Strengthening International and Regional 
Financial Assessment and Peer Review 
 
The fourth pillar of the G20 financial reform agenda addresses international standards 
and their implementation and monitoring, focusing on international assessment and peer 
review. In June 2010, the G20 reaffirmed its support for the FSAP, peer review through 
the FSB, and related processes to address non-cooperative jurisdictions with respect to 
adherence to prudential standards, tax havens, money laundering, and terrorist 
financing.116  
 
6.1 International Financial Standards and their Implementation 
 
As was the case following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, 117  development and 
implementation of international financial regulatory and supervisory standards has been 
an important focus of international efforts in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
Following G20 agreement, the main international regulatory organization is the FSB, 
formed as the FSF in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and reconstituted in 2009 in 
response to the more recent financial crisis. Hosted by the BIS in Basel, Switzerland, the 
FSB brings together G20 finance ministries and central banks and/or regulatory 
authorities, along with the main international and regional financial institutions (BIS, IMF, 
World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
European Central Bank, and European Commission) and international standard-setting 
bodies (BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, IASB, CGFS, and Committee on Payment and Settlement 
                                                 
116 G20 (2010), p. 5 and 20–21. 
117 See Arner (2007); Weber and Arner (2007). 
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Systems [CPSS]). In addition, there are separate international organizations addressing 
Islamic finance118 and deposit insurance, among others. 
 
6.1.1 Financial Stability Board 
 
As reconstituted, the FSB is to (i) assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, 
and identify and oversee required actions; (ii) promote coordination and information 
exchange among authorities responsible for financial stability; (iii) monitor and advise on 
market developments and their implications for regulatory policy; (iv) advise on and 
monitor best practices in meeting regulatory standards; (v) undertake joint strategic 
reviews of the policy development work of the international standard setting bodies, such 
as the BCBS and IOSCO, to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, focused on 
priorities, and addresses any gaps, (vi) set guidelines for and support the establishment 
and functioning of, and participation in, supervisory colleges, including through ongoing 
identification of the most systemically important cross-border firms, (vii) support 
contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to 
systemically important firms; and (viii) collaborate with the IMF to conduct early warning 
exercises to identify and report to the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial 
Committee and the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors on 
macroeconomic and financial risks, and the actions required. 
 
In turn, FSB members, subject to FSB elaboration and reporting, commit to (i) pursue 
the maintenance of financial stability, (ii) enhance the openness and transparency of the 
financial sector, (3) implement international financial standards, and (4) agree to 
undergo periodic peer reviews. 
 
As noted in section 4, discussions are on-going with respect to the establishment of a 
high-level AFSD which would include officials from finance ministries and central banks, 
and other financial regulators and supervisors. The AFSD would coordinate supervisory 
and regulatory developments, as well as monitor implementation of more detailed 
regional standards—in some ways similar to the pre-crisis Lamfalussy process in the 
EU. Given that Asian economies are generally recovering more quickly than those of 
Europe and the US, Asia is addressing issues with respect to recovery and potential 
inflation—both price and asset—that are not shared with all other G20 members and in 
which regionally coordinated approaches, or at least experience sharing, might be highly 
valuable. 
 
Significantly, in June 2010, the G20 mandated the FSB to expand upon and formalize its 
outreach activities beyond the G20 to reflect the global nature of finance, 119  with 
potentially important implications for both financial sector development initiatives 
(discussed in Section 7) and regional financial standard development (discussed below). 
 
6.1.2 Tax Havens and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions 
 
Building on the statement from November 2008, the G20 made strong commitments 
regarding tax havens in the April 2009 communiqué. The G20 took a very firm line in this 
context: "The era of banking secrecy is over." With respect to actions, the G20 Financial 
                                                 
118 Related issues are discussed in section 7. 
119 G20 (2010), p. 20 
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System Declaration included a toolbox of six measures120 and, following G20 agreement, 
the FSB is in the process of establishing a framework of peer reviews. 
 
Regarding tax disclosure and cooperation, the G20 highlighted the publication by the 
OECD of a list of countries assessed by the OECD’s Global Forum on Taxation vis-à-vis 
international tax information exchange standards. 121  To date, all 17 Asia–Pacific 
jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD have implemented or committed to implement the 
OECD’s tax transparency and information exchange standards: Australia; Brunei 
Darussalam; India; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; Marshall Islands; Nauru; New Zealand; 
Niue; PRC (including Hong Kong, China and Macau, China); Philippines; Samoa; 
Singapore; and Vanuatu. Of these, six (Brunei Darussalam, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Niue, Philippines, and Vanuatu) have committed to—but not yet substantially 
implemented—the tax standard. Given the state of development of the Pacific members 
of this group, it is likely that assistance in meeting the standards would be beneficial, 
whether provided by ADB or others. 
 
6.1.3 Implementation of International Financial Standards 
 
In 2009, the G20 tasked the FSB and IMF to develop a similar mechanism for 
international prudential regulatory standards. This indicates that the existing system of 
international financial standards will be given an effective enforcement mechanism for 
the first time, based on mechanisms previously used in the context of addressing money 
laundering and, more recently, tax havens. In addition, the FSB has established an 
Implementation Monitoring Network.122  
 
Most significantly, in January 2010, the FSB released a Framework for Strengthening 
Adherence to International Standards,123 following in March by a supporting initiative,124 
building in many ways on previous experiences with the FSAP and tax compliance. 
 
The framework and initiative are designed to (i) examine jurisdictions’ compliance 
against international supervisory and regulatory standards relating to cooperation and 
information exchange, (ii) examine the reasons for shortcomings in adherence, (iii) 
discuss the jurisdiction’s progress in meeting the relevant recommendations set out in 
any FSAP, and (iv) make recommendations on steps to improve compliance. The focus 
is on the core standards of the BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS. In the context of reviews, 
                                                 
120  (i) increased disclosure requirements, on the part of taxpayers and financial institutions, to report 
transactions involving non-cooperative jurisdictions; (ii) withholding taxes for a wide variety of 
payments; (iii) denying deductions regarding expense payments to payees residing in a non-
cooperative jurisdiction; (iv) reviewing tax treaty policy; (v) asking international institutions and regional 
development banks to review their investment policies; and, (vi) giving extra weight to the principles of 
tax transparency and information exchange when designing bilateral aid programs. 
121 See OECD (2009). 
122 FSB (2009b), p. 14. 
123 FSB (2010a). 
124 FSB (2010e). 
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options focus on dialogue and capacity building,125 market incentives for adherence,126 
and addressing non-cooperative jurisdictions.127 
 
These are issues in which the role of an AFSD could be potentially important. Moreover, 
the establishment of international monitoring arrangements through the FSB and IMF, in 
addition to extending existing FSAP arrangements, indicates that Asian G20 members 
will need to focus particularly on G20 and FSB financial regulatory commitments and 
standards. The FSB however is unlikely to be resourced with significant means to 
support implementation. As a result, emerging Asian G20 members would benefit from 
the availability of regional resources to support reform, including mechanisms to benefit 
from experience and expertise within the region, perhaps through ADB. As highlighted 
above, areas of concern will be the scope of regulation, identifying gaps in regulation, 
and designing appropriate regulatory structures and responses. In addition, a range of 
substantive issues will require attention. These were addressed in sections 3, 4, and 5, 
and comprise pillars I, II, and III of the G20 financial reform agenda, respectively. 
 
6.2 Implementation of International Standards: Regional Cooperation 
 
Beyond the AFSD, which is still at an early stage of development, Asia has also 
developed a range of other cooperative mechanisms to support implementation of 
international financial standards; increase Asia’s voice in international standard-setting 
fora; and, more recently, to regionalize international standards in certain areas. In this 
respect, cooperative mechanisms can be divided into three major forms: traditional 
regional organizations (e.g., ASEAN and APEC); central bank organizations, of which 
the most successful are EMEAP and SEACEN; and regulatory fora, which to date have 
largely been regional subgroups of the main international regulatory organizations. 
 
6.2.1 Traditional Regional Institutions and Organizations: ASEAN and 
APEC 
 
In looking at the main regional organizations, financial norms and standard development 
have been limited. To date, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 states have been unprepared to 
relinquish the high degree of national policy control associated with weak regional 
institutions and organizations. Thus, the extent of regional integration is consistent with 
shared norms, whether deliberately adopted as is common with the consensual "ASEAN 
way," the making paramount of other aspects of state policy, or indirectly managed as 
                                                 
125 In relation to dialogue and capacity building, options include (i) policy dialogue; (ii) technical 
assistance; (iii) use of MMOUs; (iv) letters to the finance minister; and (v) membership processes, 
such as conditions on membership of organizations like the FSB. 
126 Market incentives include: (i) raising awareness about standards, (ii) highlighting compliant 
jurisdictions, (iii) using compliance as a condition for market access, and (iv) developing lists of non-
cooperative jurisdictions. 
127 Methodologies for addressing non-compliant jurisdictions include (i) progress reports; (ii) suspension of 
membership privileges, for example, to the FSB; (iii) advisory letters to financial institutions regarding 
dealing with non-compliant jurisdictions; (iv) increased regulatory requirements on financial institutions 
from non-compliant jurisdictions; (v) increased supervisory examination of institutions from and 
institutions dealing with non-compliant jurisdictions; (vi) increased audit requirements; (vii) higher 
capital requirements; (viii) restrictions on financial institutions doing business with non-compliant 
jurisdictions; (ix) restrictions on transactions by international financial institutions such as ADB; and (x) 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions involving the non-compliant jurisdiction. 
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with the participation of commercial and banking interests in governance. The 
organization of Asian capitalism in the developmental state model has been effective 
serially in Japan, Korea, and the PRC in this respect, characterized by close directional 
relationships between the state and leading commercial interests.128  
 
The most dramatic result of subsuming regionalism to national policy objectives is seen 
in the accumulation of international reserves in the region after 2000, partly as a 
consequence of the primacy of national exchange rate policies over financial integration 
or regional market development.  
 
In the context of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), ASEAN’s 1995 Framework 
Agreement on Services (AFAS)129 seeks to reduce barriers to trade in services, requiring 
members to negotiate to lift restrictions in specific market segments and—to some 
degree—expand upon their commitments under the WTO’s General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). A 2006 assessment of AFAS commissioned by ASEAN and 
Australia’s official Regional Economic Policy Support Facility concluded that its 
performance was both disappointing and unimpressive.130 At the same time, given that 
financial services as well as investment are now included across the ASEAN+3 treaties, 
this is an area with the potential to support further regional financial integration. 
 
In relation to APEC, in 1998 the APEC Finance Ministers endorsed the establishment of 
the APEC Financial Regulators Training Initiative to build and enhance staff at financial 
supervisory and regulatory authorities to promote financial sector stability. This is the 
longest running initiative endorsed by the finance ministers and currently organizes over 
10 regional training programs per year.131 While APEC was thought to be an effective 
forum for economic concerns prior to the 1997/98 crisis, since then it has been less 
successful and the emphasis on governance and resources has shifted to ASEAN+3, 
WTO, and ASEAN+6 (including India, Australia, and New Zealand). It remains to be 
seen whether Japanese or US APEC chairmanship will be capable of altering this 
perception. 
 
6.2.2 Central Bank Organizations 
 
At the international level, the primary international central bank organizations are the 
IMF, BIS, and various "Gs" (e.g., G7, G10, and G20). Prior to the 1990s, these 
organizations had limited Asian representation and participation, with Japan being the 
major exception. While this changed in the 1990s, so did attitudes within the region, 
especially toward the IMF. Although the IMF has been relatively less successful in 
providing support for regional central bank communication and cooperation, Asia has 
developed other organizations such as South East Asia, New Zealand, Australia 
(SEANZA), the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training 
Centre, and the Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP). At 
least partially in response, the BIS has been working since the 1990s to strengthen its 
                                                 
128 See especially Redding (1990).  
129 ASEAN (1995), Part. IV. Certain financial sector requirements commitments were strengthened in 
2002/03. ASEAN (2003). 
130 Thanh and Bartlett (2006), p. 6. 
131 www.adb.org/Projects/APEC. 
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role in supporting its Asian membership and increasingly plays a significant supporting 
role for EMEAP and regional central bank cooperation, as well as regulatory cooperation 
and standard-setting. 
 
BIS: Bank for International Settlements 
 
Established in 1930 and headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, the BIS is the international 
organization of central banks. In 1998, the BIS established its first representative office, 
the Representative Office for Asia and the Pacific (Asian Office) in Hong Kong, China. 
There are currently 12 Asian members of the BIS.132 In 2001, the BIS established the 
BIS Asian Consultative Council (ACC), comprising the 12 Asian BIS member central 
banks, with the BIS Asian Office providing the Secretariat for the ACC. Thus, the BIS 
ACC is EMEAP plus India and its membership parallels the largest and/or most 
developed members of ASEAN/+3/+6. While EMEAP operates separately, it also works 
closely with the BIS through the Asian Office and the ACC, with the Asian Office 
increasingly focusing on the needs of the ACC by providing support for regional 
initiatives such as the various Asian Bond Funds. 
 
SEANZA: South East Asia, New Zealand, and Australia 
 
SEANZA grew out of a 1956 meeting of central bank governors from the British 
Commonwealth countries in the Asia–Pacific region, in which the governors agreed they 
should pool resources to provide training courses for staff. There are now 19 
members.133 The main functions of SEANZA are the provision of a (i) biennial central 
bank training course, (ii) forum for central bank governors, and (iii) forum for banking 
supervisors.  
 
SEACEN: South East Asian Central Banks 
 
SEACEN was established in 1966, with an informal SEACEN Centre established in 
1982. There are now 16 members 134  and 2 observers. 135  Since 2001, training has 
become the principal activity of the SEACEN Centre with staff from a wide range of 
central banks in the region participating in training activities.136 The SEACEN Centre’s 
research activities play a supporting function.  
                                                 
132 Australia; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Philippines; 
PRC; Singapore; and Thailand. 
133 The original members were the central banks of Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In 
addition to the original four, the central banks of a range of Asian economies also now participate. As 
of 2009, these included Bangladesh; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Iran; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; 
Macau, China; Mongolia; Nepal; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; PRC; Singapore; and Thailand. 
134 The members are Bank Indonesia, Bank Negara Malaysia, Central Bank of Myanmar, Nepal Rastra 
Bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Bank 
of Thailand, Bank of Korea (1990), central bank of Taipei,China (Taipei,China) (1992), Bank of 
Mongolia (1999), Ministry of Finance of Brunei Darussalam (2003), Reserve Bank of Fiji (2004), Bank 
of Papua New Guinea (2005), National Bank of Cambodia (2006), and State Bank of Viet Nam (2006). 
135 Bank of the Lao PDR and the National Reserve Bank of Tonga are currently observers. 
136 These are Central Bank of Afghanistan, Reserve Bank of Australia, Bangladesh Bank, Royal Monetary 
Authority of Bhutan, People’s Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Reserve Bank of India, 
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank of Japan, Monetary Authority of Macao, Maldives 
Monetary Authority, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, State Bank of Pakistan, Central Bank of Samoa, 
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EMEAP: Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks 
 
EMEAP was established in 1991 as a cooperative organization of central banks and 
monetary authorities in the East Asia and Pacific Region, with the primary objective of 
strengthening cooperative relationships among its members. There are currently 11 
member central banks from the region.137 EMEAP focuses on key issues of member 
concern—monetary and financial stability, financial market development, central bank 
operations, banking supervision, and IT—as expressed in its various meeting structures. 
 
EMEAP’s highest profile activity has been the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) initiative, with the 
first stage launched in 2003, the second stage launched in 2004, and future directions 
currently under discussion. In addition to EMEAP, the ABF initiative involves the 
Reserve Bank of India—thus paralleling the BIS ACC, with support coming from the BIS 
Asia Office. In addition, EMEAP now co-organizes meetings with the European Central 
Bank (EMEAP–Eurosystem High Level Seminars)138  to increase communication and 
deepen relations between EMEAP and the Eurosystem, with meetings held annually 
since 2004. EMEAP also coordinates training programs with the Financial Stability 
Institute and others. 
 
EMEAP plays a significant role in central bank coordination and cooperation amongst its 
membership, and works closely with ASEAN/+3/+6, ADB, BIS (especially the BIS ACC 
and Asian Office), and international standard setters. As a result of shared crisis 
experiences, the effectiveness and impact of the group has grown, with regional 
initiatives such as the ABF and support for CMIM. 
 
6.2.3 Regulatory Agency Organizations 
 
As noted above, the FSB brings together the main international regulatory organizations. 
Prior to the global financial crisis, most of these organizations had been increasing their 
level of regional participation. As a result of G20 commitment, the most significant of 
these organizations have now expanded membership and governance to include Asian 
G20 members. 
 
BCBS: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
The BCBS is the primary international standard setter in the area of banking. Until 2009, 
it comprised G10 banking supervisors. Following directions from the G20 in 2009, it has 
now expanded its membership to encompass the G20. Asian members thus include the 
banking regulators of Australia; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; 
PRC; and Singapore. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Central Bank of the Solomon Islands, Banking of Payment Agency Timor-Leste, and Reserve Bank of 
Vanuatu. 
 
137 Reserve Bank of Australia, People’s Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, 
Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bangko Sentral 
ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Bank of Thailand. 
138 The Eurosystem comprises the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the euro 
area. 
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CPSS and CGFS: Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Committee 
on the Global Financial System 
 
The CPSS is the primary international standard setting organization in the area of 
payment and settlement systems—a key area of traditional concern in relation to 
systemic risk, financial integration, and financial development. Until 2009, it comprised 
G10 central banks but following G20 directions in 2009, its membership now 
encompasses the G20 and FSB, including the following central banks from Asia: 
Reserve Bank of Australia, People's Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
Reserve Bank of India, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, and Monetary Authority of 
Singapore.  
 
The CGFS is mandated to seek to identify and assess potential sources of stress in the 
global financial environment; to further the understanding of the functioning and 
underpinnings of financial markets and systems; and to promote the development of 
well-functioning and stable financial markets and systems. Like the CPSS, its 
membership until 2009 comprised G10 central banks, but has now been extended to 
parallel that of the CPSS, including its Asian membership. 
 
IOSCO: International Organization of Securities Commissions 
 
IOSCO is the primary international financial standard-setting organization in the area of 
securities regulation. Unlike the BCBS, its membership prior to the recent global financial 
crisis was open, with wide Asian participation. Today, 23 Asian securities regulators are 
IOSCO ordinary members 139  and six Asian agencies are associate (non-voting) 
members.140 Finally, there are two Asian affiliate members: the Australian Securities 
Exchange and ADB. In addition, as a deeper expression of cooperation, IOSCO has 
developed a self-regulatory mechanism to support information exchange and regulatory 
cooperation, the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU). 
Significantly, there are a large number of Asian signatories, with 10 Asian regulatory 
agencies currently parties to the agreement.141 There are currently an additional five 
pending Asian applicants.142  
                                                 
139 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Brunei International Financial Center of the Ministry of Finance, China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, Securities and Exchange 
Board of India, Indonesian Capital Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency, Financial 
Services Agency (Japan), Financial Supervision Agency (Kazakhstan), Financial Services 
Commission/Financial Supervisory Service (Korea), State Agency for Financial Surveillance and 
Accounting (Kyrgyzstan), Malaysia Securities Commission, Financial Regulatory Commission 
(Mongolia), New Zealand Securities Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission (Pakistan), 
Papua New Guinea Securities Commission, Philippines Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Sri Lanka Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial 
Supervisory Commission (Taipei,China), Securities and Exchange Commission (Thailand), Center for 
Coordination and Control over Functioning of Securities Market (Uzbekistan), and Viet Nam State 
Securities Commission. 
140 Forward Markets Commission (India), Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Japan), Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan), Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (Japan), 
Korea Deposit Insurance Commission, Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority (Malaysia). 
141 Australia Securities and Investments Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, Hong 
Kong Securities and Futures Commission, Securities and Exchange Board of India, Financial Services 
Agency (Japan), Securities Commission (Malaysia), Securities Commission (New Zealand), Monetary 
Responding to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Meeting the Challenges in Asia  |       49 
 
 
 
Through the IOSCO Asia Pacific Regional Committee, ASEAN members have engaged 
in discussions (with support from ADB) on use of IOSCO standards as the basis for 
regional standards. In this context and as a first step, the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum 
(ACMF) has now agreed to regional standards based upon IOSCO standards for equity 
and debt securities disclosure (the ASEAN and Plus Standards Scheme).143 The ACMF, 
established in 2004 and comprising ASEAN capital markets regulators, initially focused 
on harmonization of rules and regulations (e.g., cross-border offerings of securities 
through the ASEAN and Plus Standards Scheme). In April 2009, with the endorsement 
of the ASEAN Capital Markets Integration Plan144 at the 13th ASEAN Finance Ministers 
Meeting in April 2009, ACMF’s focus was made broader and more strategic. 
 
IAIS: International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
The IAIS is the primary international standard-setting organization for insurance 
regulation. Like IOSCO, its membership is universal, with 27 members from a wide 
range of Asian jurisdictions, and it has recently developed an MMOU.145 Unlike IOSCO, 
however, the IAIS has not yet established a formal regional committee.  
  
In 2000, ASEAN established an ASEAN Insurance Regulators Meeting and an ASEAN 
Insurance Training and Research Institute (AITRI). AITRI was officially incorporated in 
2004, with the Malaysian Insurance Institute in Kuala Lumpur providing the Secretariat. 
AITRI provides training for regulators and the private sector, conducts research studies, 
and is supporting the implementation of IAIS standards in ASEAN. 
 
IASB: International Accounting Standards Board 
 
IASB is the primary international standard-setting organization for accounting standards 
(International Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS]). At present, Australia, PRC 
(including Hong Kong, China), India, and Japan all have reserved places in the 
governance framework. Importantly, essentially all of the Asia–Pacific region has or is in 
the process of adopting IFRS, or is adjusting domestic standards for equivalence. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Authority of Singapore, Securities and Exchange Commission (Sri Lanka), and Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Thailand. 
142 Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Agency, Financial Services Commission/Financial Supervisory 
Service (Korea), Financial Regulatory Commission (Mongolia), Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Philippines), and Financial Supervisory Commission (Taipei,China). 
143 ACMF (2008a, 2008b). 
144 ACMF (2009). 
145 Australia (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, Motor Accidents Authority of New South Wales, 
Private Health Insurance Administration Council), Bhutan, Cambodia, Taipei,China (Financial 
Supervisory Commission), Fiji (Reserve Bank of Fiji), Hong Kong, China (Office of the Commissioner 
of Insurance), India, Japan (Financial Services Agency), Kazakhstan (National Bank of Kazakhstan), 
Korea (Financial Supervisory Service), Labuan Malaysia (Labuan Offshore Financial Services 
Authority), Macau, China (Monetary Authority of Macao), Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), Mongolia, 
Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan (Securities and Exchange Commission), Papua New Guinea 
(Department of Finance & Treasury, Bank of Papua New Guinea), Philippines, PRC (China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission), Samoa, Singapore (Monetary Authority of Singapore), Sri Lanka (Insurance 
Board of Sri Lanka), Thailand, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu (Vanuatu Financial Services Commission), and 
Viet Nam. 
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6.3 Developing Regional Financial Standards 
 
Asian regionalism in the development of financial norms and standards has a limited, 
albeit expanding, history. In the initial post-war period, the focus was very much on 
domestic development, with a range of competing models adopted, from central 
planning and financial allocation to economic laissez-faire, and a range of developmental 
state models (including administrative direction of financial allocation) gradually 
emerging as the most successful. In this period, and in the context of the Bretton Woods 
system restrictions on capital movements and domestically oriented financial systems, 
there was in fact very limited attention paid to financial standards at the international 
level or even in the context of Europe. However, there were initial developments in Asia, 
first with the development of the SEANZA forum from the late 1950s, focusing on central 
bank communication and cooperation in shared training needs. In addition, with the 
success of post-war Japanese development, Japan began to increase its profile in 
international economic and financial organizations, joining the OECD in 1964. At the 
same time, from the late 1960s, initial movements were made toward increasing an 
Asian voice in international institutions, with SEACEN and the development of the South 
East Asia voting group in the IMF and World Bank, and the creation of ADB in 1966.  
 
Following these initial steps, the focus in the 1970s continued to be domestic financial 
development in the region, increasingly modelled on the Japanese experience and 
developmental model, including administrative direction of financial allocation. 
International cooperation in the development of financial norms and standards also 
remained limited, although it expanded in the 1970s on a largely informal basis. As a 
result, there was little need or demand for Asian regionalism in this respect. In the wake 
of the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and the return of 
cross-border finance and currency instability, the 1970s witnessed the initial beginnings 
of a range of transnational regulatory networks, such as the BCBS based at the BIS in 
the early 1970s, and the establishment of the Library Group (1974), Group of 6 (1975), 
and G7 (1976), all of which included Japan.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, as capital movements were increasingly liberalized and finance 
globalized, international cooperation in the development of financial norms and 
standards increased, largely on the basis of transnational networks. During this period, 
Asian countries increased participation in related international institutions, largely 
adopting the consensus supporting financial liberalization and seeking to learn from 
Western experience, without any desire or move towards leadership but while also 
recognizing the increasing value of communication on regional issues with the 
establishment of EMEAP in 1991. With the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis came the first 
major impetus for Asian regionalism in supporting regional financial stability and 
regionalizing international cooperation and coordination. 
 
Following the Asian financial crisis, in the area of finance, East Asian countries felt the 
need for alternatives to international mechanisms such as the IMF. Since the crisis, 
cooperation in relation to financial norms and standards through EMEAP, 
ASEAN/ASEAN+3, and ADB has increased dramatically. At the same time, the regional 
consensus shifted away from financial liberalization and towards export-led growth and 
reserve accumulation in the context of monetary and financial stability domestically, 
regionally, and internationally. Efforts during this period focused on bond market 
development through the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), alternative liquidity 
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arrangements through CMI, and initial steps towards regionalization of international 
financial norms and standards.  
 
At the international level, following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, transnational 
networks addressing international financial norms and standards were institutionalized 
through the FSF, G20 (operating at Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor level 
until 2008), and the IMF–World Bank FSAP. It was during this period as well that 
international institutions such as the BIS and IOSCO began to court Asian participation, 
in some cases in direct competition with regional institutions such as EMEAP, with the 
BIS establishing its first regional office in Hong Kong, China in 1998. At the same time, 
East Asia’s participation in the FSAP has been more limited than that of other regions, 
reflecting to some extent a continuing distrust of the IMF and also increasing support for 
more regionally tailored approaches. Finally, it was also during this period that Asia’s 
first international financial norm and standard-setting organization was established, the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) in 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, and that ASEAN 
agreed to regional limited liberalization of financial services (with the development of the 
financial provisions of the AFAS) and developed the first regional versions of 
international financial standards (with the ASEAN and Plus Standards Scheme in 2008). 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–10, new impetus has developed for 
Asian regionalism in the development of financial norms and standards. At the 
international level, Asian participation is being courted with the expansion of the G20 to 
heads of government meetings (with Korea hosting in 2010) and the restructuring of the 
FSF into the FSB, including expansion of membership and governance to parallel the 
G20 not only in the FSB but also across the major international financial regulatory 
organizations (BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, and IASB). Within the region, countries are working 
to establish an AFSD and also looking toward regional arrangements to support 
monetary and financial stability, such as an Asian currency and/or Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF), building upon CMIM. 
 
Today, international financial norm and standard development takes place mainly 
through the G20 (overall policy) and the FSB and BIS (coordinating international 
standard-setting organizations such as the BCBS), with domestic implementation 
supported by the World Bank and ADB, among others, and regional implementation in 
the EU (and increasingly ASEAN) and monitoring conducted through the FSB and IMF. 
At the same time, trade in financial services operates in parallel through the WTO, as 
well as regionally in the EU and to a more limited extent in ASEAN/+3/+6. 
 
In Asia, the ASEAN/+3/+6 Finance Ministers process plays a policy-setting role—to 
some extent—through the CMIM process (ASEAN+3) and most recently with ASEAN’s 
adoption of a capital market integration plan in 2009. Regional financial and monetary 
policy cooperation also takes place through EMEAP and the BIS ACC, with support from 
the BIS. Standards have largely been taken from the international process, but with 
increasing moves to develop regionally tailored equivalents through regional groups of 
international organizations, such as IOSCO, and increasingly through ASEAN. At the 
same time, there have been initial steps to develop an AFSD to coordinate regional 
cooperation, coordination, and standard development. Implementation of international 
standards is widespread in the region, but willingness to participate in international 
monitoring through the IMF is limited, albeit likely to increase as a result of G20 
 
52          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 60  
 
 
 
commitments to FSAP participation. 146  Likewise, regional trade in financial services 
liberalization is limited but with the potential to increase. As a result of the global 
financial crisis, there is the potential for regionalism at all levels of financial norm and 
standard development to increase, not only in the context of ASEAN/+3/+6, but also 
more widely, in order to support financial stability and development. 
 
Regional financial cooperation and integration in Asia has reached a point where further 
development can best be obtained through deepening institutionalization towards more 
formal, rules-based regional arrangements. In this context, the overriding objectives 
across the region continue to be (i) economic growth and development; and (ii) social, 
economic, financial, and political stability. These are twin objectives which sometimes 
conflict but which also indicate potential avenues for formalizing regional arrangements 
relating to finance.  
 
 
7. Financial Sector Development: Supporting Growth and 
Addressing Imbalances 
 
For Asia, perhaps more so than in relation to financial regulation, the key lesson of the 
recent crisis has been the need to further develop and rebalance domestic economies, 
broaden trade and investment sources and destinations, and enhance domestic and 
regional financial systems. 
 
7.1 The G20, Global Imbalances, and Financial Sector Development 
 
Not surprisingly, to date, the G20 has focused much more on economic and financial 
stability rather than on financial sector development. In their April 2009 communiqué, 
leaders committed to "build a stronger, more globally consistent, supervisory and 
regulatory framework for the future financial sector, which will support sustainable global 
growth". However, attention paid to the role of finance in supporting sustainable global 
growth was limited, with finance to support growth not even included within the overall 
reform objectives or in assigned regulatory objectives except to the extent that regulators 
were tasked to "support competition and dynamism". Significantly, while the FSB has not 
been given a specific mandate to address financial sector development, in June 2010, it 
was mandated to expand and formalize its outreach activities globally.147  
 
In April 2009, G20 leaders committed "not only to restore growth but to lay the 
foundation for a fair and sustainable world economy."148 In this context, they reaffirmed 
their commitment to meeting the Millennium Development Goals and achieving existing 
aid commitments. Financial commitments did extend to development and growth 
considerations, with a headline figure of US$850 billion, including support for a 200% 
ADB capital increase to "support growth in emerging market and developing countries by 
helping to finance counter-cyclical spending, bank recapitalization, infrastructure, trade 
                                                 
146 FSAPs in the Asia–Pacific have so far been completed for Australia (2006); Hong Kong, China (2003); 
Japan (2003); Kazakhstan (2004); Korea (2003); Kyrgyz Republic (2003); Mongolia (2008); Pakistan 
(2004); Singapore (2004); Sri Lanka (2007); Tajikistan (2008); and Thailand (2009). 
147 G20 (2010). 
148 G20 (2009c). 
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finance, balance of payments support, and social support." 149  In addition, leaders 
committed to developing a charter for sustainable economic activity, based on a "new 
global consensus on the key values and principles that will promote sustainable 
economic activity". 150  Leaders also committed to the completion of the Doha 
development round of trade negotiations and United Nations (UN) climate change 
negotiations. 
  
In their September 2009 Pittsburgh communiqué, G20 leaders focused on maintaining 
economic stimulus and working to meet existing commitments. At the same time, unlike 
previous statements, leaders looked explicitly forward, pledging "to adopt the policies 
needed to lay the foundation for strong, sustained, and balanced growth", including 
"growth without cycles of boom and bust and markets that foster responsibility not 
recklessness."151 In so doing, the G20 committed to (i) launch a framework that lays out 
policies and cooperation to generate strong, sustainable, and balanced global growth; (ii) 
address regulatory issues; (iii) reform the global economic and financial architecture;  (iv) 
take new steps to increase access to food, fuel, and finance among the world’s poorest 
while clamping down on illicit outflows; (v) phase out and rationalize over the medium-
term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing targeted support for the poorest; and 
(vi) maintain openness and move toward greener, more sustainable growth. 
 
In relation to sustainable growth, leaders agreed upon the need to establish a pattern of 
more sustainable and balanced growth across countries, and to reduce development 
imbalances. In this context, leaders agreed that "[e]nsuring a strong recovery will 
necessitate adjustments across different parts of the global economy," including 
macroeconomic policies that promote adequate and balanced global demand, and 
"decisive progress" on structural reforms to foster domestic demand, narrow 
development gaps, and strengthen long-run growth potential.152 
 
In this respect, leaders launched a new Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and 
Balanced Growth, based on agreed Core Values for Sustainable Economic Activity, 
which significantly includes two principles addressing financial sector development153 
among its eight principles.154 The framework is to include: (i) fiscal, monetary, trade, and 
                                                 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 G20 (2009f). 
152 Ibid. 
153 According to the third principle, leaders have a responsibility to ensure, through appropriate rules and 
incentives, that financial and other markets function based on propriety, integrity, and transparency, 
and to encourage businesses to support the efficient allocation of resources for sustainable economic 
performance. According to the fourth principle, leaders have the responsibility to provide financial 
markets that serve the needs of households, businesses, and productive investment by strengthening 
oversight, transparency, and accountability. 
154 Under the first principle, leaders have a responsibility to ensure sound macroeconomic policies that 
serve long-term economic objectives and help avoid unsustainable global imbalances. Under the 
second, leaders have responsibility to reject protectionism in all its form, support open markets, foster 
fair and transparent competition, and promote entrepreneurship and innovation across countries. 
Under the fifth principle, leaders have responsibility to secure the future through sustainable 
consumption, production, and use of resources in a manner that conserves the environment and 
addresses the challenge of climate change. Under the sixth, leaders have responsibility to invest in 
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structural policies collectively consistent with sustainable and balanced growth; (ii) a 
sustainable growth model to take into account social and environmental dimensions of 
economic development; and (iii) a process of mutual assessment among G20 members, 
based on shared policy objectives supported by medium-term policy frameworks, with 
primary responsibility assigned to the IMF and G20 finance ministers and central bank 
governors.155 From the standpoint of financial sector development and addressing global 
imbalances, the framework includes two commitments: (i) G20 members with sustained, 
significant external deficits pledged to undertake policies to support private savings and 
undertake fiscal consolidation, while maintaining open markets and strengthening export 
sectors; and (ii) G20 members with sustained, significant external surpluses pledged to 
strengthen domestic sources of growth, including (depending on circumstances) 
increasing investment, reducing financial market distortions, boosting productivity in 
service sectors, improving social safety nets, and lifting constraints on demand growth. 
 
In addition, in the context of strengthening support for the most vulnerable, G20 leaders 
made specific commitments relating to financial sector development, with the 
establishment of a G20 Financial Inclusion Group—comprising the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), among 
others—tasked to identify lessons learned in providing finance to the poor, promote 
regulatory and policy approaches, and establish standards on financial access, literacy, 
and consumer protection. In this context, as a significant initial step, the BCBS in 
February 2010 released principles related to microfinance for consultation.156 In addition, 
the Financial Inclusion Group has released principles for innovative financial inclusion. 
 
In June 2010, G20 leaders announced it was their "highest priority" to safeguard and 
strengthen economic recovery and "lay the foundations for strong, sustainable, and 
balanced growth."157 On the basis of initial mutual assessments and reports by the IMF 
and World Bank,158 the G20 committed to a series of concerted actions that would be 
differentiated and tailored to national circumstances: (i) establish sound fiscal finances 
"to sustain recovery, provide flexibility to respond to new shocks, ensure the capacity to 
meet the challenging of aging populations, and avoid leaving future generations with a 
legacy of deficits and debts"; (ii) strengthen social safety nets, enhancing corporate 
governance reform, financial market development, infrastructure spending, and greater 
                                                                                                                                                 
people by providing education, job training, decent work conditions, health care, and social safety net 
support; and to fight poverty, discrimination, and all forms of social exclusion. Under the seventh, 
leaders have responsibility to recognize that all economies are partners in building a sustainable and 
balanced global economy in which the benefits of economic growth are broadly and equitably shared, 
including achievement of internationally agreed development goals. Finally, leaders have responsibility 
to ensure an international economic and financial architecture that reflects changes in the world 
economy and the new challenges of globalization. 
155 Specifically, the framework is to include: (i) implement responsible fiscal policies; (ii) strengthen 
financial supervision; (iii) promote more balanced current accounts and support open trade and 
investment; (iv) pursue monetary policies consistent with price stability in the context of market 
oriented exchange rates that reflect underlying economic fundamentals; (v) implement structural 
reforms to increase potential growth rates and, where needed, improve social safety nets; and (vi) 
promote balanced and sustainable economic growth in order to narrow development imbalances and 
reduce poverty. 
156 BCBS (2010a). 
157 G20 (2010), p. 2. 
158 IMF (2010b); World Bank (2010). 
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exchange rate flexibility in emerging markets; (iii) pursue structural reforms across the 
entire G20 membership to increase and sustain growth prospects; and (iv) make more 
progress on rebalancing global demand.159  
 
While financial sector development concerns were not central to the crisis, except to the 
extent of excessive financialization in certain markets, issues with respect to global 
imbalances were significant factors in the pre-crisis build-up of excesses and these 
relate directly to financial sector development, especially in Asia. 
 
7.2 Imbalances in the Role of Finance in Asia’s Pre-crisis Growth Model 
 
The economic successes in Asia have—to a certain extent—masked structural problems 
in Asia’s model of economic development.160 These structural problems mainly include 
focus on weaknesses in financial intermediation and its capacity to support balanced 
sustainable growth Such structural problems, if not dealt with carefully, will undermine 
the building blocks of Asia’s growth model. Perhaps more significantly, the global 
financial crisis has undermined one of the central features of the Asian growth model: its 
historic dependence on exports to developed Western markets. 
 
Transnational financial activity has been important in Asia for generations, first in 
domestic or colonial direct investment, and in trade finance provided by commercial 
banks; and in the period of the post-1960s Asian economic miracle, as a result of a 
strong export-orientation and relatively open borders for capital flows. The character of 
today’s Asian financial markets is heavily influenced by inflows from overseas, outward 
portfolio investment, the presence of non-Asian intermediaries and investors, and the 
influence of financial innovation imported—sometimes with modifications to account for 
local conditions—from New York and London. 
 
The Asian model of development has enabled a succession of Asian economies to 
unleash rapid growth. The model, however, does not come without costs. The success 
and sustainability of this model largely hinges on a number of assumptions. First, there 
exists an effective system of financial intermediation, which continuously channels 
capital (savings and investment) to the most wanted and most profitable sectors in an 
economy. Weaknesses in this respect were brought dramatically to light during the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Likewise, in the context of the Great Moderation, Asian 
savings surpluses have tended to be exported to Western financial centers, providing 
fuel for global asset inflation. Second, reliance on foreign markets, especially the US and 
the EU, has been a driver—in some cases, the driver—of economic development. This 
model provided the engine for growth before and after the Asian financial crisis; 
however, in the wake of the global financial crisis, it is now clear that exports and 
demand must be more balanced domestically, regionally, and internationally. Third, high 
levels of savings will continue in Asia, and Asia will continue to provide a large number 
of low-cost workers. To date, high savings and the availability of low-cost workers 
continue; however, there is now a clear need and consensus to increase consumption in 
major economies in the region and to redirect savings toward domestic and regional 
development. Fourth, the particular approach to macroeconomic and structural policies 
                                                 
159 G20 (2010), p. 2-3 and 10-14. 
160 For detailed discussion, see Liu, Arner, and Lejot (Forthcoming). 
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that has been adopted by Asian governments can deliver high growth along with a 
reasonable degree of macroeconomic stability. At the same time, the costs and welfare 
loss associated with the accumulation of foreign reserves in Asia can be managed at a 
sustainable level. Reserve accumulation and their use are the focus of continuing 
domestic and regional attention, especially through CMIM and ABMI. Finally, regional 
competition, especially competition for cheaper factor inputs (e.g., labor), will not 
generate imbalances and become a source of instability. While imbalances to date have 
mainly been considered at the international level, there are increasing concerns about 
regional imbalances, which is an issue of medium-term concern. 
 
The global financial crisis has raised questions with respect to each of these conditions 
and, as agreed upon by the G20, highlighted the importance of financial sector 
development in the region as part of a global process of balanced growth. 
 
7.3  Financial Sector Development 
 
Overall, one aspect of finance which the global financial crisis has not changed is the 
fact that finance remains central to growth and development, albeit with potentially high 
periodic costs.161 Experience and research demonstrate that an appropriately designed 
institutional framework for finance is necessary to achieve the twin objectives of 
supporting economic growth and financial stability. 162  First, a reliable institutional 
framework is essential to provide the rules of the game for financial transactions and to 
support financial sector development. Without an appropriate legal and institutional 
framework, effective finance will not develop. Across Asia, financial sector development 
remains an important objective. In fact, in the wake of the global financial crisis and the 
consensus to support more balanced and sustainable global growth, further domestic 
and regional financial development in Asia is now essential. Second, weak financial 
sectors have been a significant cause of many financial crises, including the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis. An appropriately designed 
legal and regulatory framework is necessary to strengthen financial intermediaries and to 
help prevent the occurrence of crises. To date, these issues have been the primary 
focus of the G20 and have been addressed in preceding sections. Third, as discussed in 
section 6, in the context of financial distress or crisis, an effective framework supports 
                                                 
161 For detailed analysis, see Arner (2007).  
162 Schinasi provides the most comprehensive definition of financial stability: Financial stability is a 
situation in which the financial system is capable of satisfactorily performing its three key functions 
simultaneously. First, the financial system is efficiently and smoothly facilitating the intertemporal 
allocation of resources from savers to investors and the allocation of economic resources generally. 
Second, forward-looking financial risks are being assessed and priced reasonably accurately and are 
being relatively well-managed. Third, the financial system is in such condition that it can comfortably if 
not smoothly absorb financial and real economic surprises and shocks. 
Schinasi (2006), p. 82. This definition implies that the objective is maintaining the smooth functioning 
of the financial system and maintaining the system’s ability to facilitate and support the efficient 
functioning and performance of the economy, and having in place the mechanisms to prevent financial 
problems from becoming systemic or from threatening the stability of the financial and economic 
system, but without undermining the economy’s ability to sustain growth and perform its other 
important functions. 
Ibid., p. 100. Schinasi’s definition thus extends beyond crisis prevention and addressing systemic risk 
to support for financial development (and thereby, directly or indirectly, economic growth). 
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the resolution of difficulties. In the absence of such a framework, crisis resolution 
becomes much more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. 
 
This institutional framework for finance has two main elements: the foundations of 
financial sector development, and financial regulation and supervision. The institutional 
foundations of financial stability and development comprise three principal aspects:163 
the preconditions for finance,164 macroeconomic and monetary policy,165 and financial 
infrastructure. 166  Three principal elements of the institutional framework for financial 
regulation and supervision can be identified: first, a competitive market-based financial 
system; second, a well-designed financial regulatory and supervisory system, including 
effective regulators with clearly defined objectives and roles; third, mechanisms to 
address financial problems when they arise. 167  In achieving these elements, the 
regulatory system should be designed to achieve certain objectives: financial stability, 
prudential supervision, consumer and market integrity protection, and competition. 
 
Against this set of criteria, in each case, recent events have highlighted weaknesses in 
the design of the financial regulatory systems around the world. Against the twin 
objectives of growth and stability, the proposals to date are in many ways important but 
are not sufficient to put in place an institutional framework to support economic growth. 
 
Across Asia, there is a clear need to focus efforts on financial sector development to 
support growth and rebalancing. In this context, efforts should focus first on the 
foundations of finance and financial infrastructure, especially effective payment systems, 
clear and transparent property rights, information infrastructure, and corporate 
governance arrangements, including insolvency arrangements, and dispute resolution 
systems. In the context of financial regulatory systems and development, significantly, 
the BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS are now all revising their respective core principles, with a 
greater focus on preconditions. Across much of the region, these preconditions 
(foundations and infrastructure) remain a central focus for development. In the context of 
                                                 
163 See Arner (2007), chs. 3–5. 
164 The preconditions for finance are the fundamental elements necessary for finance to develop and 
function, namely which may be termed foundations of financial development and economic growth, 
and institutional underpinnings of finance. Financial systems require certain legal and institutional 
elements to be in place in order to function. These include property rights, collateral frameworks and 
company law, which, in turn, must be set in a framework supporting effective governance providing for 
enforcement of contracts and commercial dispute resolution. Arner (2007), ch. 3. 
165 Financial sector development occurs best and stability is most likely to be maintained in the context of 
a stable macroeconomic setting, including appropriate monetary, financial and fiscal policies and 
frameworks. Arner (2007), ch. 4. 
166 Certain elements of institutional and market infrastructure are essential to support the development of 
an effective financial system. These elements build upon the institutional underpinnings operating in 
the context of macroeconomic stability and are necessary for the financial regulatory systems and 
structures to function properly in a market economy. These sorts of legal infrastructure necessary for 
financial systems to function properly include payment and settlement systems, government bond 
markets, insolvency regimes, corporate governance, and accounting and auditing systems (―financial 
information‖). These are supported by appropriate measures to protect market integrity and thus 
confidence in the financial system. It is only when both the foundations and the supporting 
infrastructure are in place that financial market liberalization, regulation, and supervision can function 
properly. Arner (2007), chs. 4–5. 
167 See Arner (2007), chs. 6–10. 
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banking, banking systems need to extend their reach to a broader portion of the 
population, especially SMEs, including through continued development of microfinance 
markets. In the context of securities markets, infrastructure, transparency, and corporate 
governance are central to development (as well as stability), not only in equity markets 
but also in debt markets. In insurance, major opportunities are presented for 
development of pensions and contractual savings arrangements to support use of 
financial resources in the region and also to underlie social safety nets across the region 
necessary to support increased consumption. 
 
7.4 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 
 
The G20 principles for innovative financial inclusion, released in June 2010, address 
nine areas: (i) leadership, 168  (ii) diversity, 169  (iii) innovation, 170  (iv) protection, 171  (v) 
empowerment,172 (vi) cooperation,173 (vii) knowledge,174 (viii) proportionality,175 and (ix) 
framework. 176  Overall, these principles aim to provide guidance in establishing an 
enabling environment for innovative financial inclusion, aimed at closing the financial 
services access gap for over 2 billion people around the world. As such, they provide a 
clear frame of reference for developing countries in the region, as well as ADB, in 
seeking to build inclusive growth supporting financial development. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
168 There should be a broad-based government commitment to financial inclusion to help alleviate 
poverty. 
169 Policy approaches should be implemented that promote competition and provide market-based 
incentives for delivery of sustainable financial access and usage of a broad range of affordable 
services (e.g., savings, credit, payments and transfers, insurance), as well as diversity of service 
providers. 
170 Technological and institutional innovation should be promoted as a means to expand financial system 
access and usage, including by addressing infrastructure weaknesses. 
171 A comprehensive approach to consumer protection should be encouraged that recognizes the roles of 
government, business, and other stakeholders. 
172 Financial literacy and financial capability should be developed. 
173 An institutional environment should be created with clear lines of accountability and coordination within 
government that encourages partnerships and direct consultation across government, business, and 
other stakeholders. 
174 Improved data should be used to make evidence-based policy, measure progress, and consider an 
incremental ―test-and-learn‖ approach acceptable to both regulator and service provider. 
175 A policy and regulatory framework should be built that is proportionate with the risks and benefits 
involved in such innovative products and services, and is based on an understanding of the gaps and 
barriers in exiting regulation. 
176 The following should be considered in the regulatory framework, reflecting international standards, 
national circumstances, and support for a competitive landscape: (i) an appropriate, flexible, risk-based 
anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) regime; (ii) conditions for 
the use of agents as a customer interface; (iii) a clear regulatory regime for electronically stored value; 
and (iv) market-based incentives to achieve the long-term goal of broad interoperability and 
interconnection. 
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8. International and Regional Financial Architecture 
 
Beyond questions of financial regulation and financial development, the global financial 
crisis has raised the question of whether there is a need to reform or redesign the 
international financial architecture. On balance, the arrangements put in place following 
the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis were neither effective in preventing a global systemic 
financial crisis nor (with the possible exception of the G20) effective in dealing with such 
a global systemic crisis when it actually occurred. At the very least, the fundamental 
features underlying the original post-war design—open trade, fixed exchange rates, 
domestically oriented finance, and coordinated development assistance—no longer 
exist, with the exception of liberal trade. Today, the global economy is one of a largely 
open trading system, generally floating exchange rates, globalized finance, and 
decentralized support for development. As demonstrated by the global financial crisis, 
the global financial system remains prone to periodic instability and crises.  
 
8.1 The G20 and the International Financial Architecture 
 
While most of the focus of the November 2008 G20 meeting was on economic 
coordination and regulatory responses, under their fifth principle, the G20 committed ―to 
advancing the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so that they can more adequately 
reflect changing economic weights in the world economy.‖177 In this respect, the G20 
Action Plan mandated six immediate actions and three medium term actions.178  
 
The first immediate action directed the FSF to broaden its emerging economy 
membership, resulting in the inclusion of members of the G20 which were not previously 
FSF members—Brazil, PRC, India, Russia, and Turkey.179 Other major standard-setting 
bodies, including the BCBS and IOSCO, have now modified their membership and/or 
governance structures to varying extents. 180  The second immediate action item 
delineated responsibilities, with the IMF focusing on surveillance and the FSF focusing 
on standard-setting, and mandates increased cooperation between the IMF and FSF, 
especially in integrating regulatory and supervisory processes into the macroprudential 
framework and conducting early warning exercises. The third directed the IMF to take a 
leading role in drawing lessons from the crisis, in close coordination with the FSF and 
others. The fourth committed to a review of the adequacy of resources of the IMF, the 
World Bank Group and other MDBs, with increases as necessary. At the same time, 
these institutions were directed to review and adapt their lending instruments to meet 
members’ needs, and to revise their lending roles in light of the crisis. The fifth was an 
agreement to explore ways to restore emerging market and developing country access 
to finance in the context of the crisis, including private capital flows. Finally, MDBs were 
                                                 
177 G20 (2008), p. 3. 
178 See G20 (2008), p. 5. 
179 FSF (2009a). 
180 The BCBS extended its membership to include Argentina; Indonesia; Saudi Arabia; South Africa; 
Turkey; Hong Kong, China; and Singapore. BCBS (June 2009a). IOSCO invited the securities 
regulatory authorities from Brazil, PRC, and India to become members of the Technical Committee. 
IOSCO (2009h). The IAIS did not broaden its membership after the G20 declaration—the last new 
member was the European Commission in April 2008—but there has been an increased emphasis on 
group-wide supervision and macroprudential regulation, in line with the dictates of the G20. IAIS 
(2009). 
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directed to put in place arrangements to support countries with good records and sound 
policies. 
 
The medium-term actions are more ambitious. First, the G20 committed to 
comprehensive reform of the Bretton Woods institutions so that they can more 
adequately reflect changing economic influence in the world economy and be more 
responsive to future challenges, with emerging and developing economies to be given 
greater voice and representation. Second, the IMF was directed to conduct vigorous and 
even-handed surveillance reviews of all countries as well as giving greater attention to 
their financial sectors, including improving integration of the FSAP, all in support of 
providing improved macrofinancial policy advice. Third, the advanced economies and 
the IMF committed to providing necessary capacity building programs for emerging 
market and developing economies to support implementation of international regulatory 
standards. 
 
In their April 2009 statement, G20 leaders built significantly on these initial commitments. 
In relation to strengthening global financial institutions, the G20 provided details of their 
headline US$850 billion funding commitments, with additional details provided in a 
second annex, the International Financial Institutions (IFI) Declaration.181 Essentially, this 
breaks down into US$750 billion for the IMF through an additional US$250 billion 
Special Drawing rights (SDR) allocation, by expanding the New Arrangements to Borrow 
(NAB) by US$500 billion, and by considering "market borrowing if necessary."182 The IFI 
Declaration supplements this with a commitment to doubling the IMF’s concessional 
lending capacity and access limits, funded by gold sales. 183  The remaining 
US$100 billion comes from capital increases for the multilateral development banks 
(MDBs).184 In addition, the IMF was directed to implement a new Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL),185 and to reform lending and conditionality "to ensure that its facilities address 
effectively the underlying causes of countries’ balance of payments financing needs, 
particularly the withdrawal of external capital flows."186 The IFI Declaration expands this 
to include support for certain World Bank and International Development Assistance 
(IDA) funds.187 
 
As a second element, the April 2009 G20 statement addressed issues relating to the 
relevance, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the IMF and MDBs. Specifically, the 
mandates, scope, and governance of these entities are to be reviewed and reformed "to 
reflect changes in the world economy and the new challenges of globalization."188 Better 
                                                 
181 G20 (2009d). 
182 G20 (2009c), paras. 17 and 19, including ratification of the Fourth Amendment to the IMF Articles. 
183 G20 (2009d), p. 1. 
184 G20 (2009c), para. 17. This is elaborated to include ―full and exceptional use of MDB balance sheets‖ 
for lending; a 200% capital increase for the ADB and capital reviews for the AfDB, IADB, and EBRD; 
actions by MDBs ―to leverage private capital more effectively‖; and support for a new International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) Global Trade Liquidity Pool of US$50 billion to support US$250 billion of 
trade finance and other MDB trade finance facilitation efforts. G20 (2009d), p. 2. 
185 To date, three countries, Poland, Mexico, and Colombia, have accessed the Flexible Credit Line. 
186 G20 (2009c), para. 18. 
187 G20 (2009d), p. 2. 
188 G20 (2009c), para. 20. 
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strategic oversight and decision making are mandated to enhance credibility and 
accountability.189  
 
In support of these objectives, the leaders committed to (i) implementing IMF quota and 
voice reforms agreed to in April 2008, with the IMF to complete the next review of quotas 
by January 2011; (ii) giving consideration to greater involvement of the Fund’s 
Governors in providing strategic direction to the IMF and increasing its accountability; (iii) 
implementing World Bank reforms agreed to in October 2008, with further 
recommendations to be agreed to in 2010; (iv) heads and senior leadership of the IFIs to 
be appointed through an open, transparent, and merit-based selection process; and (v) 
building on the current reviews of the IMF and World Bank, consulting widely in an 
inclusive process and reporting back with proposals for further reforms to improve the 
responsiveness and adaptability of the IFIs.190  
 
At Pittsburgh in September 2009, G20 leaders reaffirmed their earlier commitments and 
extended them in one significant respect: the G20 designated itself as the ―premier 
forum‖ for international economic cooperation, but did not extensively address reform of 
the international financial architecture beyond reaffirming previous commitments. In 
June 2010, the G20 committed once more "to strengthening the legitimacy, credibility, 
and effectiveness of the IFIs" and outlined progress on capital increases and other 
previous commitments. 191  Importantly, the G20 tasked finance ministers and central 
bank governors ―to prepare policy options to strengthen global financial safety nets‖ with 
the goal of building a more stable and resilient international monetary system, 
addressing capital flow volatility, financial fragility, crisis contagion, and the role of the 
IMF.192 
 
As a result, it appears likely that discussions relating to reform of the international 
financial architecture will be a key theme of the Seoul summit in November 2010. 
Specifically, in relation to MDB reforms to enhance effectiveness, efficiency, and 
accountability, the G20 outlined a number of ongoing reform commitments to build "not 
just bigger MDBs, but better MDBs, with more strategic focus on lifting the lives of the 
poor, underwriting growth, promoting security, and addressing the global challenges of 
climate change and food security."193 These include (i) commitments to further support 
the poorest countries in a financially prudent way, including by transferring resources, 
where feasible, from MDB net income to their respective lending facilities for low-income 
countries and increasing their investment activities in low-income countries and frontier 
regions; (ii) specific actions for greater transparency, stronger accountability, improved 
institutional governance, deeper country ownership, more decentralization and use of 
country systems where appropriate, enhanced procurement guidelines, new ways of 
managing and tracking results and financial contributions, and a range of internal 
administrative reforms; (iii) deeper support for private sector development as a vital 
component of sustainable and inclusive development; and (iv) recommitting to their core 
                                                 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 G20 (2010), p. 5–6 and 22–27. 
192 Ibid., p. 6. 
193 Ibid., p. 23–24. 
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development mandates and taking up a greater role in the provision of global solutions 
to transnational problems, such as climate change and food security. 
 
8.2 Enhancing the International Financial Architecture 
 
If the objective of the international financial architecture is a framework to support 
sustainable global development based upon liberal trade and global finance, the current 
framework, while largely effective in supporting trade liberalization (through the WTO 
and ever-increasing regional arrangements, including across Asia and especially 
throughout ASEAN/+3/+6), has not been effective in supporting financial stability. At the 
international level, a range of proposals have been made to address related issues. 
 
Serious proposals have been put forward by the UN through the Stiglitz Commission and 
the PRC, among others. Key issues identified include, first, the need for rebalancing of 
the global economy, focusing on the relationship between the US, PRC, and East Asia. 
Second, economies and international organizations must strengthen and intensify 
regulation of international speculative capital flows, including reinforcing regulation, 
enhancing transparency, developing EWS and other preventive measures for developing 
economies, increasing aid, and providing mechanisms to address temporary balance of 
payments problems that are swift and with limited conditionality. Third, there must be 
appropriate measures to channel more savings into developing and emerging 
economies, and to redirect savings to such markets as the future growth engines of the 
world economy. Fourth, reform of the international monetary system must be 
considered. 
 
Overall, these recommendations need to be seriously considered, as global imbalances 
played an important role in the pre-crisis build-up and currency instability remains a 
continuing concern in Asia. In achieving these objectives, focus should be placed on the 
aspects which have proven necessary in the context of the global economy. First, there 
is a clear need for some sort of mechanism to support economic cooperation and 
coordination, the role now being filled by the G20. Second, trade arrangements are at 
the heart of the design, with special needs for financial liberalization and cross-border 
provision of services. Third, there is a need for some system of macroeconomic policy 
standard-setting and monitoring, which is to some extent the role that the IMF plays 
through its surveillance activities. This would include monetary arrangements. Fourth, if 
finance is to remain globalized, there is a clear necessity for appropriate financial 
stability and development arrangements to both prevent financial crises and resolve 
those crises which do occur, at the sovereign level and at the level of global financial 
institutions and markets. Fifth, sustainable development is now no longer just a domestic 
issue but one with global implications—positive and negative. 
 
In looking at these issues, from the overall objective and specific needs, the discussion 
turns to questions of organization and allocation of responsibilities, mandates, and 
powers, and only then to questions of the design of individual organizations, including 
membership, governance, funding, independence, and accountability. 
 
8.2.1 Coordination 
 
The need for international economic cooperation and coordination has been clearly 
demonstrated by the variety of arrangements which have been attempted—League of 
Responding to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Meeting the Challenges in Asia  |       63 
 
 
 
Nations, BIS, UN, OECD, Comecon, European Economic Community, the various "Gs", 
and most recently the G20. At the most basic level, it is clearly significant for heads of 
government and senior economic officials to meet periodically on a multilateral basis in 
order to discuss common issues and concerns which are probably an unavoidable 
element of a global economy. However, immediately issues of inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness arise: who should be there and who should not in order to have the most 
effective discussion? These are issues that have been at the center of recent 
discussions in Asia, with ASEAN+3 emerging as the most developed mechanism to 
date.  
 
On balance, though perhaps a bit unwieldy, the G20 has during the current crisis 
emerged as a relatively effective forum for cooperation and coordination. A similar group 
(of 16) has also been active in climate and trade negotiations. The general view amongst 
members is that the G20 is both useful and appropriate, and probably does not require 
any greater level of formality than has previously been the case, albeit with the probable 
exception of the need for some sort of formal secretariat to provide support. 
 
For Asia, the question is how to achieve a common voice in the G20, in order to balance 
the US and EU. In this context, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 could provide such a 
mechanism, with the AFSD playing a similar role in the context of the FSB.  
 
8.2.2 Trade 
 
Overall, the WTO has not played an overly significant role during the global financial 
crisis. However, it has arguably played an important role in providing an outlet for 
disputes arising from the crisis-inspired protectionist inclinations of a range of countries 
around the world. In addition, in the wake of the global crisis, the WTO has been the 
focus of increasing attention in relation not only to traditional trade-related disputes, but 
also to other issues such as currency valuations. At the same time, the April G20 
directive to the WTO to engage in third-party monitoring of protectionist measures is a 
potentially significant development for the organization and its role in the global 
economy. At the least, it is indicative of general support for continued global trade. 
Nonetheless, the Doha round remains largely stalled, as a result of the crisis and 
attentions being directed to other issues such as food, energy, and climate change.  
 
In addition, while support continues for liberalization of trade in goods, issues respecting 
investment, competition, and financial services have largely been abandoned, with 
interest in these issues in all likelihood suffering as a result of the crisis. In respect of 
financial services, the crisis likely means that there will be very limited support for further 
liberalization in the near future. This provides the possibility of advancing related issues 
in the regional context, especially relating to investment and financial services 
liberalization.  
 
8.2.3 Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy 
 
In a global economy and especially one with a global financial system, problems in one 
economy can quickly spread to another, whether or not similarly situated. This was a 
clear lesson of crises in the 1980s, 1990s, and today, most recently in the context of 
Greece. As a result, self-protection indicates the need for some sort of mechanism for 
monitoring the macroeconomic stability of countries. While this could be done at the 
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bilateral level (and is in some cases), efficiency arguments would suggest the use of 
centralization of this sort of function—perhaps at the regional as well as global level. 
Such monitoring includes transparency at the sovereign level (one area in which 
changes following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis have been largely effective) as well 
as issues relating to fiscal policy and monetary policy. 
 
In the context of macroeconomic policy, the IMF has arguably been rather effective in 
terms of both enhancing transparency and in providing external monitoring through its 
data, research, and surveillance functions. As such, there is a strong argument for 
building upon its effectiveness in these areas. At the same time, it has been much less 
effective in the context of financial stability, which has not been part of its central 
mandate, and development, where its structural adjustment policies and approaches 
have been subject to much criticism. In this context, discussions are underway on 
reforming the IMF’s mandate—an important opportunity to clarify and focus its role and 
resources to more closely match the needs of today’s global economy and financial 
systems. 
 
This crisis has brought back to light questions regarding international currency 
arrangements which have largely been dormant since the 1970s and the end of the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. In this context, the highest profile 
proposals have been put forward by the Stiglitz Commission and the PRC. These begin 
with the premise that, as demonstrated by the current global financial crisis, the risks of 
the current system of floating exchange rates exceed its benefits and fail in the overall 
objective of supporting trade and enhancing economic growth and financial stability. In 
place of the current system, both propose a new system based on an international 
reserve currency disconnected from individual nations that would be able to remain 
stable. While this is not a new idea, harking back to ideas of Keynes and discussions 
from the 1970s, it is the first major proposal along these lines from a major economy in 
decades. 
 
Overall, achieving this would be a long-term vision, requiring a long-term process with 
specific deliverables. Several initial steps can be identified. The first is to strengthen 
surveillance of reserve currency countries—rather a reverse of the approach traditionally 
taken by the IMF. Second is to broaden the SDR. In this respect, several elements 
would be included: (i) developing a settlement system between the SDR and other 
currencies; (ii) promoting use of the SDR in international trade, commodities pricing, 
investment, and corporate accounts; (iii) creating financial assets denominated in SDR, 
for example from the IMF; and (iv) improving valuation and allocation, with the SDR 
based on a basket comprising all major economy currencies, GDP-weighted, with 
allocation on the basis of real assets. Both initial steps suggest entrusting member 
reserves to the IMF, with an open-ended SDR fund and centralized management. 
 
Given the clear problems with developing any sort of international currency 
arrangement—such as financial services and investment—this is an area in which 
regional attention could focus. This, in fact, has been the approach taken in the EU since 
the 1970s, resulting in the single currency, and is currently under early discussions in 
Asia. At the same time, while currency arrangements can be regionalized, global 
macroeconomic surveillance remains essential—a fact highlighted by the global financial 
crisis. In addition, regional macroeconomic and financial surveillance mechanisms also 
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have clear value, as demonstrated both by the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and the 
more recent global financial crisis, especially in the context of the euro area. 
 
8.2.4 Financial Stability and Development 
 
As highlighted by the November 2008 and April 2009 G20 meetings, financial regulation 
has been the central focus at the domestic, regional, and international levels in the 
context of the current crisis. In looking forward, three elements need to be addressed: 
(i) crisis prevention (largely focusing on regulation), (ii) crisis management (largely 
focusing on liquidity arrangements), and (iii) crisis resolution (focusing on mechanisms to 
address both sovereign and global financial institution crises). 
 
Crisis prevention: Regulation 
 
As a result of the global financial crisis, the pre-existing system based on the FSF, while 
not fundamentally a cause of the crisis, has been exposed as insufficient to meet the 
realities of global finance and its attendant risks. In looking at this issue, there are a 
variety of potential approaches. 
 
At the most fundamental level is the question which was addressed at Bretton Woods: 
whether on balance finance should be global. While the decision taken at Bretton Woods 
was in the negative, in the context of the global financial crisis, despite some misgivings, 
the consensus appears to be settling in favor of continued globalization of finance, albeit 
with enhanced mechanisms for prevention and resolution of problems arising. 
 
In this context, the discussions in many ways have followed the forms of global 
administrative law, with approaches ranging from a traditional hard law treaty-based 
approach centered on a formal international organization down to uncoordinated 
domestic responses. While the latter have been found to be ineffective in the context of 
global finance (albeit not domestic finance under the Bretton Woods design), despite 
periodic proposals for a global financial regulator, a traditional international 
law/international organization approach does not seem feasible at this time, even in the 
context of the EU: issues of domestic sovereignty continue to make a global regulator for 
global finance unlikely for the foreseeable future. In looking forward, on balance, it 
appears to make little sense to incorporate financial regulation into the WTO framework, 
both because the WTO system is already overburdened and also due to its focus on 
negotiated liberalization combined with dispute resolution, which is not overly useful in 
the context of financial regulation.  At the same time, however, if amendments were to be 
undertaken to the IMF Articles of Agreement, then this would also present an opportunity 
to provide the IMF with a specific mandate and related tools in relation to financial 
stability. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, purely soft law cooperative arrangements, such as the 
BCBS and the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, as existed until 1999 have proven ineffective 
in preventing and resolving international crises. Following financial crises in the 1990s, 
to some extent, the cooperative mechanisms were given a greater level of coordination 
through the FSF and a higher level of formality through the FSAP monitoring 
mechanisms. Once again, however, a hardened soft law approach of coordinated 
networks with limited external monitoring of compliance proved insufficient to address 
either prevention or resolution of a truly global financial crisis. 
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Discussion has thus turned towards intermediate arrangements. At the next level down 
from a formal international law/international organization approach are discussions of 
creating a formal legal underpinning for the existing network model. While this is the 
approach which is largely being pursued in the EU following the Larosière Report, with 
European authorities composed of domestic agencies responsible for setting regional 
regulation but with domestic enforcement, this approach has not yet been followed at the 
international level and may still prove impossible even in the EU context. 
 
Instead, the approach which has been adopted at the international level by the G20 is a 
further strengthening of the pre-crisis system, through the transformation of the FSF into 
the FSB, with a wider range of member commitments and strengthened peer review and 
external monitoring mechanisms. Overall, the FSB might work reasonably well when it 
comes to coordination and prevention functions without it being a formal, legally based 
international institution, but the issue which remains is how to handle cross-border 
financial institution failures. Although the FSB will play a role in facilitating discussion 
among its members, what is lacking from the system is the ability to put its members 
under binding obligations that will lead to a greater willingness to burden-share the costs 
of cross-border bank failures. Some form of binding arbitration mechanism might be the 
best way to achieve this (and this in fact is the approach being pursued in the EU), but 
without a more formal and binding arrangement for burden sharing and dispute 
resolution arrangement, probably through a formal treaty and/or international 
organization, the problems raised by the failure of global financial institutions will not be 
adequately addressed by the current approach to international financial regulation. In 
many ways, these were amongst the major causes of the systemic phase of the global 
financial crisis, failing to properly address these issues must be seen as either indicating 
that significant risks will continue to exist in the context of global finance or a tacit 
conclusion that finance and financial institutions will no longer in fact be global. 
Unfortunately, based on the unsuccessful experience of the IMF’s proposals for a 
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism,194 the outlook for failure resolution mechanisms 
for cross-border financial institutions is not overly bright. 
 
Crisis management: Liquidity 
 
Assuming that crises will occur in the future—both at the economy-wide level and in 
individual global financial institutions and markets—there is a clear need to put in place 
appropriate liquidity arrangements in advance. One lesson of the current crisis has been 
the essential need for appropriately structured mechanisms for liquidity provision in 
times of stress; a liquidity provider of last resort ready to provide liquidity to solvent 
borrowers on the basis of any reasonable collateral is required. Those central banks, 
such as the ECB, that planned in advance for such circumstances and built the 
appropriate systems were best placed to manage liquidity provision during the acute 
phases of the crisis. 
 
At the international level, there are two sides to this: (i) economies which experience 
temporary liquidity problems, including a range of major emerging market economies 
during 2008–2009; and (ii) private financial institutions. In relation to economies, the 
initial response largely came from the major central banks, especially the Federal 
                                                 
194 See IMF, Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr 
/ facts/sdrm.htm 
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Reserve and to a more limited extent the European Central Bank, through swap and 
credit lines. This, however, is a function which could reasonably be centralized with the 
IMF and MDBs—a process which appears to be now underway.195 The weaknesses—
already identified by the G20—is that any such arrangement in today’s global financial 
system must be backed by the availability of very large amounts of money, certainly 
beyond the IMF’s current capacity. As such, the mechanism—essentially an emergency 
liquidity mechanism—requires major extension of the IMF’s access to funding, including 
SDR allocations and multilateral borrowing arrangements, including potentially from not 
only public sector lenders but also private sector lenders. In addition, regional 
arrangements—such as those being developed through CMIM and currently being 
considered in the EU—can provide a useful addition to international arrangements. 
 
At the level of private financial institutions, the IMF is not well-suited as a potential 
liquidity provider of last resort. As a result, it seems that individual private financial 
institutions are likely to remain quite closely associated with their home jurisdiction and 
the major central banks of jurisdictions in which they operate. This highlights the 
usefulness not only of swap lines from major reserve currency central banks but also 
regional arrangements. 
 
Crisis resolution 
 
Unfortunately, not all crises are liquidity crises and it is certain that in the future both 
economies and individual financial institutions will periodically face insolvency. In the 
context of resolving international insolvencies, the IMF has emerged as the default 
option; if problems are not severe, bilateral central bank, sovereign, or regional 
assistance may be available. However, in circumstances involving severe financial 
problems where financial system stability is at stake, the politically acceptable solution 
has been to turn to the IMF. This was certainly the reaction in Asia in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis. But even in the context of Asia’s discussions relating to IMF 
alternatives, in the context of severe sovereign fiscal problems, the IMF would in all 
likelihood be involved, much as has been the case in the EU with Greece. 
 
Unlike sovereign crises, it is certain that the IMF is not the appropriate entity to address 
crises in individual financial institutions. At the moment, the solution is largely domestic, 
suggesting that individual economies must require separately capitalized and regulated 
subsidiaries rather than cross-border branching in financial services, and highlighting 
one of the greatest conflicts between financial services liberalization (negotiated through 
the WTO) and the requirements of domestic financial stability. As noted above, any other 
solution probably requires an international treaty, perhaps administered by the FSB. To 
the extent that international arrangements cannot be put in place, there is a clear role for 
regional arrangements, especially regional economic arrangements, such as 
ASEAN/ASEAN+3/ASEAN+6, which include provisions supporting cross-border financial 
services. 
 
                                                 
195 In the context of the IMF, through the new Flexible Credit Line, designed to provide large and upfront 
financing to members with very strong fundamentals and policies. In addition, ADB has established a 
Countercyclical Support Facility, which provides short-term, fast-disbursing loans to support DMCs 
supplement countercyclical fiscal spending in adverse market conditions. The African Development 
Bank (Emergency Liquidity Facility) and the Inter-American Development Bank (Liquidity Program for 
Growth Sustainability) have launched similar facilities. 
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8.3  The Asian Regional Financial Architecture 
 
Overall, many of the G20 commitments relating to the international financial architecture 
are now in progress, with significant developments likely by the November G20 meeting 
in Seoul. At the same time, while international arrangements are highly significant, it is 
likely that certain aspects which are not realizable at the global level may instead be 
dealt with at the regional level. In this context, the EU provides the leading example but 
also highlights the very real difficulties involved for other regions, including across Asia. 
 
The extent of financial integration between East Asia’s emerging and developing 
economies and Japan matches neither the rhetoric expended in its support after the 
region’s 1997/98 financial crisis nor the degree of regional economic integration.196 By 
some measures, it is exceeded by financial integration with Australia, New Zealand, and 
most developed western economies. Cross-border trade flows, direct investment, and 
cross-border investment in capital goods have long been greater and faster growing than 
other regional capital flows. This dichotomy persists despite certain developments since 
the early 1990s that might have encouraged financial integration. It contrasts with 
financial integration in the EU, with national enthusiasm in Asia for participation in the 
WTO, and with the sophistication of financial intermediation in several Asian financial 
centers. Above all, it differs from post-Asian financial crisis consensus expectations that 
greater financial integration would help guard against future shocks or ameliorate their 
effects. 
 
Four factors have encouraged discussions and initiatives concerning Asian financial 
cooperation, integration, and governance in the last decade. These relate especially to 
the 1997/98 financial crisis, but also to growing economic integration, developmental 
issues, and certain political influences. The means by which these factors encouraged 
integration are relevant to the policy formation processes customarily used by Asia’s 
regional bodies. 
 
Asian financial integration has been subject to considerable but equivocal attention. 
Here, the region’s transnational organizations are important for two reasons. First, they 
represent extant regional institutions and their limitations illustrate an uncommitted 
approach to regional governance; second, they have supported national actors with 
funding and technical assistance for financial reform. Initiatives to encourage financial 
integration have in particular addressed trade in financial services, cooperation in 
external monetary operations, and capital market reform.197  
 
8.3.1 Trade in Financial Services 
 
Limited growth has occurred in regional trade in financial services and any improvement 
is likely to occur only slowly. To date, cooperation in financial services liberalization has 
made limited progress. At the same time, the various ASEAN/+3/+6 trade agreements in 
force or under negotiation all address trade in financial services, in addition to goods 
trade and investment. As these agreements are implemented and their use develops, it 
                                                 
196 See Arner, Lejot, and Wang (2009). 
197 Japan’s strategies for financial cooperation, including reforming taxation through a web of new treaties, 
are beyond the scope of this analysis.  
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is likely that aspects relating to financial services trade will receive increasing attention 
as financial institutions seek to maximize opportunities in the region. At the same time, 
as clearly demonstrated by the EU’s experience in the global financial crisis, 
liberalization of trade in financial services brings with it much greater potential 
complications than is the case with trade in goods or even investment. As financial 
institutions expand regionally, the region will need to pay particularly close attention to 
addressing risks raised by cross-border financial institutions, including their regulation 
and resolution.  
 
8.3.2 Monetary Affairs 
 
Regional monetary cooperation is mainly evidenced by ASEAN+3 short-term credit lines. 
An AMF was mooted during the 1997/98 financial crisis when several Asian states 
required sudden infusions of credit but was abandoned upon intense US opposition.198 
The 2000 ASEAN+3 CMI was intended to promote regional cooperation by means of 
bilateral currency swap agreements among central banks.199 More recently in 2008 and 
2009, ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed a new accord to pool additional international 
reserves on a more considerable scale (CMIM). This would involve administrative 
resources separate from those of participating states and is currently planned to total 
US$120 billion in commitments. The PRC, Japan, and Korea would together provide 
80% of the total and ASEAN members the remainder.200 
 
At inception, 20% of the aggregate amount available for drawing under CMIM by a user 
state would be "de-linked" from specific IMF conditionality, but subject to rules to be 
developed by ASEAN+3 members.201 However, the arrangement would "supplement the 
existing international financial arrangement," 202  which suggests rules for usage that 
would be sufficiently robust and well understood so as not to erode market confidence in 
either the scheme or a user in need of temporary liquidity. ASEAN+3 stresses that usage 
would be subject to "rigorous principles."203  
 
The functions allotted to CMIM will include an independent surveillance process that 
would precede drawings or advances, either as an ongoing monitoring exercise or 
specific to requests for credit. For the scheme to be credible—regardless of its scale of 
commitments—those resources would need to be both separated from existing national 
resources and extended beyond the collaborative arrangements to which ASEAN+3 
states are accustomed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 A regional monetary fund was discussed again within ASEAN+3 in April 2006 in terms of benefits 
associated with a long-term currency alliance and monetary union. 
199 See ASEAN+3 (2000). 
200 ASEAN+3 (2008, 2009). 
201 ASEAN+3 (2000). 
202 Ibid. 
203 ASEAN+3 (2009). 
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8.3.3 Capital Market Development 
 
Post-crisis attention to regional capital market development initially focused on the debt 
and money markets, but has recently begun to consider wider securities market 
reform.204 Work on debt market development has focused on the ASEAN+3 ABMI.205 It 
also includes EMEAP central banks’ pooling of international reserves in two Asian Bond 
Funds in 2004 and 2005, with additional funds under discussion. As in similar matters, 
success has been limited due to the reluctance of state actors to cede national 
governance to create regional policy capital. Insufficient effort has been made to 
sanction non-bank financial intermediaries holding foreign regional assets, although they 
typically enjoy far greater freedom to acquire higher-rated OECD investments. 
 
8.3.4 The Role of ADB? 
 
ADB combines regional interests and elements of regional governance. While its 
operations focus on regional development, 19 of the Bank’s 67 shareholders are non-
Asian OECD members that together account for 34.96% of votes in the bank’s 
supervisory Board of Governors. Members of the G7 hold 39.56% of votes in the Board 
of Governors, the latter electing a 12 person Board of Directors, four of whom represent 
non-Asian members. The PRC, Japan, the US and India each nominate a director to 
serve their sole interests. As with other Asian organizations, the regional interests of 
ADB policy may not coincide with the aims of all shareholders. Asian policymakers have 
been supportive of ADB efforts because of the weak institutional basis of other bodies, 
including ASEAN and APEC. 
 
At the same time, ADB has given material support to financial sector cooperation, and 
policymakers generally welcome its efforts because of a lack of resources and 
institutional weaknesses in ASEAN and APEC. For example, ADB became involved in a 
coordinating function with the CMI in 2005 and established six groups in 2002 to support 
market development with funding and technical assistance at the same time as the 
launch of the ABMI by ASEAN+3.206 ADB also views its own local currency funding 
transactions as developmental, although they rely more on the structuring resources of 
private law than reforms in national policy, and hopes to widen the availability of market 
information through a web portal more comprehensive than many commercial or national 
sources.207 
 
More significantly, an Office of Regional Economic Integration (OREI) was established in 
2005 to seek to promote economic cooperation and integration among the bank’s 
developing member countries and contribute to the region’s "harmonious economic 
growth."208 This is part of the agenda of the current ADB president, placing emphasis on 
                                                 
204 ASEAN+3 is studying cooperation among exchanges and regulators to encourage cross-border 
trading. 
205 Thailand initiated the ACD in 2002 among ASEAN+3, India, and fourteen other central Asian states to 
explore regional cooperation to encourage capital market activity. The group’s visibility fell after the 
end of Thailand’s APEC chairmanship in 2004. 
206 Pholsena (2004). 
207 See http://asianbondsonline.adb.org. 
208 Kuroda (2005). OREI was created in April 2005. 
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regional economic and financial integration, and in providing resources and funding for 
research and related technical assistance projects and investments. This is an important 
distinguishing feature of ADB compared to other MDBs operating in the region. As a 
reflection of the potential of this role, a 2007 study by an ADB Eminent Persons Group209 
found agreement with these reforms which were later carried forward in the Long-Term 
Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank—Strategy 2020.210 
 
8.4 Designing an Asian Financial Architecture 
 
Could the current global financial crisis provide an incentive to financial sector 
development and integration in the region? Asia’s financial systems have so far been 
less systemically affected than the EU and the US, although Asian banks and other 
intermediaries have suffered losses in capitalization and confidence in a similar, though 
less dramatic, fashion to their western competitors. 
 
The global financial crisis has hastened changes to the setting for international economic 
and financial cooperation, chiefly a migration from the G7 and G10 mechanisms to the 
G20—which includes the PRC, India, Indonesia, and Japan from Asia—and the 
enlargement of the FSB. As a result of the crisis and the view that the participation of 
major developing economies, especially from Asia, is central to its resolution and the 
necessary reforms to the international financial architecture, Asian states are being 
asked to assume a new prominence at the international level, with the PRC’s role 
becoming increasingly prominent. 
 
As discussed above, any redesign of the international architecture should have a 
number of central elements: (i) economic policy cooperation, coordination, and 
surveillance; (ii) trade in goods and services liberalization; (ii) financial stability and 
development arrangements (including prevention, management, and resolution); and (iv) 
sustainable development coordination and assistance.211 Assuming that these issues will 
not entirely be addressed at the international level, it is important for discussions in Asia 
to look to address necessary elements on a regional basis. 
 
At present, economic policy cooperation and coordination in Asia takes place through 
ASEAN/+3/+6 Finance Ministers meetings and EMEAP, while surveillance is largely 
limited to the IMF and ADB. These arrangements may be sufficient for coordinative 
purposes; however, surveillance arguably requires a higher level of attention, with the 
CMIM having the potential to provide an appropriate framework, if effectively designed 
and implemented.  
 
Trade in goods is being addressed to date through ASEAN/+3/+6 treaty-based 
arrangements. However, based on the WTO experience, as these develop, it is likely 
that a more effective dispute resolution framework may become necessary, although at 
the moment the international arrangements through the WTO seem to be fulfilling this 
function. In financial services, because of the interaction between liberalization and 
                                                 
209 Eminent Persons Group (2007). The group comprised Supachai Panitchpakdi, Isher Judge Ahluwala, 
Nobuyuki Idei, Caio Koch-Weser, Justin Yifu Lin, and Lawrence Summers. 
210 The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008–2020. 
211 See generally Arner (2007); Weber and Arner (2007); Arner and Buckley (2010).  
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stability, these issues are likely to become more problematic, as has been the case in 
the EU during the current global financial crisis. While liberalization may proceed, 
especially as regional and global financial institutions seek greater market access, it 
would appear best for economies for the foreseeable future to adopt arrangements for 
cross-border provision on the basis of separately capitalized and regulated subsidiaries, 
rather than following the passport system which has been adopted in the EU.  
 
In relation to financial stability, initial discussions have now taken place regarding the 
possibility of establishing an AFSD, with a standard-setting and surveillance mandate 
similar to that of the FSB but operating in the regional context—in this context, EU 
experiences are likely to be highly relevant. Such an arrangement could have significant 
benefits not only in enhancing financial stability, but also in providing guidance and 
direction for financial sector development in the region. 
 
The CMIM provides the outline of a potential crisis management structure and a 
potentially important liquidity mechanism in the region, though its eventual effectiveness 
will largely depend upon the design of its implementation arrangements. However, even 
under the CMIM, crisis resolution at the sovereign level—as in the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis—remains with the IMF, with support from ADB and the World Bank. As is 
the case generally, there are no arrangements to deal with the resolution of individual 
financial intermediaries other than at the domestic level,212 nor with the contagion impact 
of systemic losses of confidence that can affect several or all economies in a region. 
 
If CMIM were to evolve into an AMF, it would seem logical to combine liquidity provision 
and macroeconomic standard-setting and monitoring with more formalized 
arrangements for developing and monitoring regional financial regulatory standards, 
based on the experiences of the FSB and the EU, with arrangements of a firmer nature 
than those of the FSB currently, but not of the same level as those in Europe. One 
model is IOSCO’s MMOU, with a self-regulatory structure applying to standard-setting 
and monitoring, with support for implementation from the ADB.  
 
This highlights the important link between the macroeconomic and financial stability 
standard-setting and monitoring arrangements in the operations of the liquidity 
mechanisms of any AMF. The division between liquidity issues and sovereign financial 
crises is not always clear; both this issue and the supporting mechanisms merit the 
greatest design attention. CMIM will itself require dedicated resources to be effective 
and give confidence, even if the preparatory development work can be accommodated 
by a collaborative arrangement to which the member states are most accustomed. 
Institutional developments of this kind also provide an opportunity to consider the proper 
organization of the functions outlined here, whether or not formalized into a new AMF, 
including purposes, extent of non-Asian involvement, if any, conditions for usage, and 
whether any single state will lead the initiative. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
212 International and domestic arrangements for addressing financial intermediary failure are an issue of 
current concern for the G20, see Arner and Norton (2009). 
Responding to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Meeting the Challenges in Asia  |       73 
 
 
 
9. Challenges Ahead and Policy Options 
 
The global financial and economic crisis has highlighted three major types of 
weaknesses. First are weaknesses in financial regulation and supervision. Second are 
the limits of export-led growth and dependence on Western markets. Third are the 
weaknesses in the reserves accumulation model. There is clear motivation to restructure 
these underlying imbalances, through developing domestic and regional growth sources, 
as well as other markets outside the developed world, especially emerging markets 
globally, with financial sector development playing a central role.  
 
In relation to financial weaknesses, seven aspects of financial regulatory design needed 
to address systemic risk can be identified: (i) a robust financial infrastructure, especially 
payment and settlement systems; (ii) well-managed financial institutions with effective 
corporate governance and risk management systems; (iii) disclosure requirements 
sufficient to support market discipline; (iv) regulatory systems designed to reinforce risk 
management and market discipline, as well as setting and monitoring potential risks 
across all financial institutions; (v) a lender of last resort to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions on an appropriate basis; (vi) mechanisms for resolving problem institutions; 
and (vii) mechanisms to protect financial services consumers, such as deposit 
insurance. 
 
The global financial crisis has highlighted significant weaknesses in each of these seven 
aspects, which are currently being addressed by the G20. At the same time, however, 
Asia faces issues beyond those highlighted by the global financial crisis. 
 
First, in relation to infrastructure, the central weakness exposed by the crisis has been in 
relation to the current bilateral structure of OTC derivatives transactions. In this context, 
the bilateral structure resulted in counterparty risks which were not adequately 
addressed either by market participants or regulators. However, in Asia, payments 
systems remain underdeveloped in many jurisdictions. Likewise, cross-border payment 
systems, especially for regional currencies, are still at the early stages of development. 
As a result, while OTC derivatives regulation has been a central focus of the G20, 
payments systems development presents perhaps greater concern in Asia, especially 
given the limited development of OTC derivatives markets in the region. From the 
standpoint of financial sector development to support growth, the development of 
effective, robust payment systems are essential to making financial resources available 
in individual economies and across the region, and in supporting the use of savings 
within the region and rebalancing financial resources towards regional development.  
 
Second, in relation to corporate governance, it has become evident that many financial 
institutions failed to adequately manage their own risks or businesses prior to the global 
financial crisis. This is certainly one of the central failures in the global financial crisis. 
Likewise, this remains a central concern in Asian markets dominated by bank financing. 
Especially in economies dominated by small numbers of banks, effective corporate 
governance is a fundamental concern, not only for stability but also for development. 
There is thus a clear need to continue the development of well-managed financial 
institutions with effective corporate governance and risk management systems at both 
corporations and financial institutions.  
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Third, disclosure requirements were not sufficient to support transparency and market 
discipline. In fact, systemic risks arose due to asymmetric information—essentially, 
weaknesses in transparency and disclosure. Such issues are characteristic of the highly 
complex structured products, which acted as the transmission mechanism of the 
excesses preceding the crisis and led to adverse selection issues during the crisis. The 
activities of CRAs exacerbated such issues both prior to and during the crisis.213 In this 
respect, transparency is fundamental not only to stability, but also to effective market 
functioning and should be a continuing major focus in the region, domestically and 
regionally. In this context, special needs relate to human capital development to support 
effective financial information provision and market discipline. 
 
Fourth, in relation to prudential regulation, in most cases, systemic risk did not arise from 
areas which were the subject of regulatory responsibility. Rather, in most cases, risks 
arose primarily from areas which were largely unregulated. Examples include mortgage 
broker activities, off-balance sheet activities of banks, thrifts and securities firms, OTC 
derivatives, and non-traditional activities of insurance companies. In these cases, risks 
often arose from regulatory arbitrage as financial firms actively moved activities outside 
of regulated areas. Such regulatory arbitrage was also in many cases made possible by 
the splintering of financial regulation in the US across a large number of regulators, with 
individual regulators usually less concerned about activities falling outside of the scope 
of their major responsibilities. In addition, systemic risks arose due to improperly 
designed prudential regulatory standards, especially in relation to capital, liquidity, and 
leverage. In this respect, appropriate coverage of regulation is an essential focus 
throughout the region, especially with regard to improving the quality, quantity, and 
international consistency of capital, including regulation to prevent excessive leverage 
and requiring buffers of resources to be built up in good times. 
 
Fifth, systemic risk arose due to the lack of appropriate mechanisms to deal with 
problems which arose from unregulated and/or unexpected sources. Examples include 
the necessity of rescuing AIG and also the lack of a mechanism for appropriately 
resolving Lehman Brothers. Prior to 2008, liquidity was generally limited to banks. The 
crisis exposed the limitations of the separation of liquidity provision from prudential 
regulation, most obviously in the cases of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, 
and AIG. In addition to the clear need for effective resolution mechanisms for banks, the 
lack of a similar mechanism capable of dealing with non-banks or financial 
conglomerates (whether bank, thrift, or other financial holding company structures) has 
highlighted a key weakness in most regulatory systems. 
 
In the context of finance, related aspects include mechanisms to address currency and 
financial stability and reduce the need for domestic reserve accumulation, with the 
potential to formalize the CMIM into an AMF. In addition to reserve cross-sharing and 
macroeconomic monitoring, an AMF should also address related issues, including 
regionalized financial regulatory norms and standards, and their monitoring, along with 
coordinating financial liberalization. In other words, an AMF could provide the formal 
mechanism to underlie the AFSD. An appropriately structured AMF could also serve 
both an accreditation function and an incentive function for countries which are not 
currently involved in CMIM. In other words, AMF membership could be predicated on 
achieving certain minimum requirements necessary for participation. Such membership 
                                                 
213 See Lejot, Arner, and Schou-Zibell (2008). 
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requirements could provide guidance and incentives for developing Asian countries to 
take certain steps in terms of macroeconomic and financial stability. 
 
Beyond stability, there is a clear need for financial sector development across the region; 
first, to support regional allocation of financial resources, and second, to support 
economic growth. In this context, Asian financial norms and standards should focus not 
only on stability but also on development, which would be quite different from existing 
international or EU norms. While an AMF is most useful for centralizing and formalizing 
stability related functions, ADB probably is the best locus for supporting continued 
financial development in the region—a role it is already playing effectively and which it 
has prioritized going forward. 
 
ADB can play an increasing role in both supporting financial stability in the region and 
supporting economic growth through appropriate financial sector development, 
especially as the region restructures its economy and financial sector towards more 
balanced growth and development. In this context, ADB provides assistance for its 
developing member economies’ financial system development through (i) financial 
support, (ii) policy advice, and (iii) technical assistance for policy implementation and 
institution building. ADB also is available to ensure that developing economies in Asia 
continue to have sufficient access to finance to support financial stability and economic 
development, especially in acting in a counter-cyclical manner by providing credit where 
needed—including trade finance. More generally, ADB supports existing work within 
ASEAN and the wider regional architecture—such as ASEAN+3—on economic 
monitoring, surveillance, and policy dialogue; capital market development; and credit 
and investment support. 
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